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Abstract
This thesis investigates the ways in which scientific and technical information are used to
challenge policies regarding development in landslide-prone areas in Seattle, Washington. It
examines the values that underlie actor arguments within those challenges, using the
theoretical lens of Science, Technology, and Society. Twelve case studies are selected from a
set of 90 permitting appeals, court cases, and growth management hearings board appeals
between the years of 1990 and 2015, and analyzed to identify the complex ways in which
scientific information is used to further actor positions. A narrative analysis approach is used
to analyze the case studies, archived news coverage, and interviews with geologists and
planners in order to identify actor values and narratives. The results of this project suggest
that, despite the science-centered arguments of developers and government, actor decisions
are highly influenced by values. Neighbors who oppose development draw their arguments
from aesthetic values; developers draw their arguments from values that center on property
rights and right to accept risk; and all actors, including government, base arguments on
potential economic gains or losses. What can be concluded is that despite hillside
development policy being based upon science and technical knowledge, actor arguments and
concerns are often based upon values, which cannot be articulated through science and
technical information. Though well-resourced actors can influence policy through the
leveraging of science and technical information, the prominence of values in debates about
landslide regulation indicate that science-based policy approaches that do not consider values
may encounter more challenges from the public.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
On March 22, 2014, a massive mudslide killed 43 people in a small rural settlement
of Snohomish County, WA. It became the deadliest landslide in U.S. history. In the aftermath
of the landslide, Snohomish County director of emergency management John Pennington
said of the hillside, “It was considered very safe. This was a completely unforeseen slide.
This came out of nowhere” (Armstrong et al., 2014).
While certain hazards, such as landslide, are natural and inevitable, disasters are not.
Social scientists conceptualize disaster as a product of a natural hazard event and of the
human conditions that expose a population to hazard. Such human conditions reduce a
population’s ability to anticipate and withstand a hazard (Wisner, 2003; Schwab et al., 2006).
Hewitt (1983, p. 27) asserts that these human conditions “prefigure” disaster and can be seen
as the root cause of it - not the environmental event in and of itself.
Several months after the Oso landslide, Governor Jay Inslee and County Executive
John Lovick commissioned a task force of scientists, politicians, and scientists to evaluate
response and recovery efforts, to outline ‘lessons learned,’ and make recommendations for
how to better prepare for future hazard events. One of the commission’s recommendations
was to fund statewide landslide hazard mapping, arguing that it “will provide the foundation
for sound public and private land-use planning and decision-making” (Oso Landslide
Commission, 2014). In April of 2015, Governor Inslee signed Senate Bill 5088, which
directed the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to complete statewide mapping of
geologic hazards using LiDAR, a remote laser-based surveying technology, and to make
those maps publically available.
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A measure like Senate Bill 5088 presupposes that the collection and dissemination of
information about hazard risk will result in policy that can prevent the ‘next Oso.’ The bill,
which was unanimously passed by the legislature, also symbolizes, as the Oso Commission
described, a ‘lesson learned.’ Statewide mapping of hazard data presents the opportunity to
create risk-averse policies in Washington state, yet many scholars within the field of Science,
Technology & Society (ST&S) criticize the notion that the production of scientific data
necessarily leads to straightforward and socially beneficial policy answers, especially if an
issue lacks consensus on the values that underlie the policy (Sarewitz, 2004; Pielke Jr, 2007;
Kahan et al., 2012; Kahan, 2012). ST&S instead proposes that policy is more heavily dictated
by cultural, social, or economic interests; further, preexisting agendas often supersede
alternate recommendations concluded by scientific studies (Sarewitz, 2004; Pielke Jr, 2007;
Kahan, 2012). In the case of hazard regulation, policies that prioritize public safety from
hazards by restricting development in hazardous areas may be surmounted by policies that
prioritize property rights, economic development, and housing availability by allowing
development in hazardous areas.
I examine the challenges that exist in translating landslide risk data into risk-based
policies, using the Seattle as a case study. In my analysis, I pull from the large body of
literature within ST&S, to examine the relationship between science and technical
information and decision-making. I analyze the ways in which different actors reconcile their
interests with scientific and technical information to illustrate the complex process of
translating hazard knowledge into acceptable policy.

3
Research Questions
I propose to address the following question and sub-questions:


In what ways do stakeholders use scientific and technical information in public
disputes about landslide regulations in Seattle, WA from 1990 to 2015?
o How do stakeholders use scientific and technical information to support their
arguments about hazard regulations or policy decisions?
o What narratives, or values, contribute to actor arguments?

The goals of this research are twofold. Firstly, I seek to identify how science information is
used in disputes, which are defined as legal challenges that revolve around landslide-related
regulations, policy-decisions, or hazard outcomes arguments about landslide risk regulation.
Secondly, I seek to identify actor narratives, which are defined as broad arguments or views
about what landslide risk regulation ought to be.
Science and technical information are often used as a means of legitimizing
arguments (Pielke, 2007; Porter, 1995), yet it is unclear the degree to which arguments about
development in landslide-prone areas are based upon the technical assessments of the slope
stability. Further, it is unclear the degree to actor values are bolstered by drawing upon
arguments using technical data on slope stability. By examining these questions, my work
helps to identify the various, contentious conversations about landslide risk happening in
Seattle among and between groups with competing interests. It identifies the arguments
offered by regulatory agents, developers, technical specialists, and the broader community
about how landslide risk ought to be regulated and considers the ways in which various
arguments and values are legitimized in the regulatory process.
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Geographic and Temporal Scope of Research
100 kilometers to the south of Oso lies the vibrant urban center of Seattle,
Washington. In 2013, Seattle was the fastest growing major city in the United States (Balk,
2014), a trend that will inevitably stimulate additional development to accommodate a
projected population growth of 120,000 people by 2035 (Department of Planning and
Development [DPD], 2014), an 18 percent increase from its current population of 662,000.
This projected growth will likely result in higher intensity development, with an estimated
need for 70,000 additional households over the next twenty years (DPD, 2014).
Yet, the city is also highly susceptible to landslides. Over eight percent of the city’s
area is classified as landslide-prone and landslide events are common in the rainy winter
months (Seattle Office of Emergency Management, 2014). Most of the city’s landslide risk is
concentrated in coastal bluff areas, where expensive real estate is often located. Landslide
risk in Seattle and in the United States in general contrasts with landslide risk in most
developing countries in terms of which populations are exposed to hazard. In many
developing contexts, the poor are disproportionately exposed to landslide risk because they
are confined to marginal hillside areas on which the wealthy are unwilling to live. In the
United States, especially in urban areas, the wealthy are often most exposed to landslide risk
because hillside areas are sought after for their views of the landscape. In Seattle,
neighborhoods with high landslide risk, including Magnolia, the coastal area of Alki in West
Seattle, and Leschi, also have some of the highest median real estate values (American
Community Survey, 2013). Though Seattle’s landslides are rarely fatal, property damage can
amount to millions of dollars. In the winter of 1996-97, damage to public and private
properties totaled $100 million (Conklin, 1999).
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Seattle’s first citywide landslide studies began in the early 1970s, but Seattle has
recorded individual landslides since 1890. In recent decades, the City has developed a
comprehensive landslide database. Between 2006 and 2008 eight major research studies on
landslides and engineering geology were published (Baum et al., 2008). Because of these
studies the “understanding of Seattle’s landslide hazard increased significantly,” according to
the Seattle Office of Emergency Management (2014). Yet, recent studies in Seattle suggest
landslide risk could be higher than previously understood (Baum et al, 2008; Schulz, 2007).
In this thesis, I focus on Seattle as a case study because of the city’s substantial urban
landslide risk, its detailed documentation of landslides, and its proactive solicitation of
hazard data from universities, federal agencies, and consultants since the mid-1990s. The
existence of extensive scientific studies about the characteristics of landslide risk in Seattle
provides an opportunity to analyze how that information is reconciled with actor interests and
decision-making.
I analyze the time period from 1990 to 2015. I chose the year 1990 as the starting year
for analysis because it marks the beginning of contemporary landslide hazard regulation in
Seattle with the passage of the GMA and Seattle’s interim environmentally critical areas
(ECA) regulations. I exclude the period prior to 1990 to avoid dispute comparison across
regulatory paradigms.
To address my research questions, I selected and analyzed twelve disputes, defined as
legal challenges that revolve around landslide-related regulations, policy-decisions, or hazard
outcomes in Seattle. All 12 fell within my 25-year time period used for this analysis. I
collected legal files and relevant news coverage for each dispute and broke down the
arguments of the involved actors by interests and type of evidence used. To examine the
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broader debate about landslide regulations, I cataloged news coverage of landslides, landslide
regulation, and landslide disputes dating back to the early 1990s. I then qualitatively coded
their text to draw out actor arguments and interests. I also solicited interviews with scientists
and planners and asked them to discuss the relationship between science and policy. Coded
news articles and informant interviews helped me to illustrate the greater ideological context
in which my selected disputes fall.
I found that the use of science is highly valued in legal disputes about landslide
regulation in Seattle, but many ordinary citizens who appeal permitting decisions do not have
access to high-level scientific data, or, feel ideologically compelled to argue their interests in
terms of values. When used by actors in disputes, science does not necessarily bring
consensus. Rather, interpretations of science may vary widely according to an actor’s
perception of what level of risk is acceptable. Values play an enormous role in determining
actor interests, perception of risk, and appropriate regulation. In this light, the production of
scientific knowledge about hazards and risk will not necessarily result in risk-averse policy if
a community’s values conflict with that policy.

Thesis Organization
The following chapter (Chapter 2) details the theoretical literature that informs this
project. The field of ST&S is broadly concerned with how the values characteristic to a
society relate to the production of scientific information and how scientific information is
used by a society. ST&S scholars theorize that information does not always lead to
straightforward policy conclusions, as policy is heavily determined by other factors, such as a
society’s values. In a hazard context, ST&S theory suggests that the production and
publication of information about hazard risk may not necessarily lead to responsive, risk-
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averse policy, because policy must also respond to values based interests, such as property
rights.
Chapter 3 describes the physical characteristics of a landslide, including descriptions
of hazard geography, magnitude, speed, and duration. The chapter examines Seattle’s
landslide hazard in the context of the Puget Sound region’s geological history and identifies
common landslide types in the Seattle area. It discusses earthquakes, rainfall, and human
activity as environmental stressors that often trigger landslides, contextualizing these
stressors within the setting of Seattle.
Chapter 4 discusses the history of landslides in Seattle and describes early reactions
to landslide losses, including liability lawsuits and expensive structural mitigation projects. It
also details the evolution of landslide hazard regulations in the city from the passage of the
State Environmental Protection Act (SEPA) in the 1970s, through the 1990s and 2000s, when
regulation was strengthened in response to massive landslide losses in 1996-97, and to
scientific studies on landslides subsequently published. Finally, Chapter 4 outlines the
current regulatory framework for development in hazards area in Seattle, detailing relevant
environmentally critical areas (ECA) regulation, different types of regulatory relief, and the
appeal process.
Chapter 5 describes the methodology of this project, detailing the sampling of
disputes for analysis, the organizational and analytical role of the qualitative analysis
software NVivo in the project, the use of interviews of scientists and planners and the coding
process by which I perform narrative analysis to draw out actor arguments and values.
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Chapter 6 provides short summaries of the twelve disputes sampled for analysis. The
chapter also summarizes general patterns identified in disputes, including the actors most
likely to prevail, with an explanation of why this may be.
Chapter 7 discusses how applicants for development and government use scientific
data to support their arguments in disputes, but neighbors who appeal permitting decisions in
opposition of development rarely use scientific data. Appellants in opposition of
development are rarely successful in part because they lack scientific data to legitimize their
claim. In some cases, different actors use scientific data in a way that supports conflicting
conclusions. The chapter identifies broad themes of liability, acceptable risk, and engineering
safety as central to the disputes about landslide regulation and policies. These themes help to
explain why actors argue for the outcomes that they do.
The thesis concludes with Chapter 8. This chapter returns to the theoretical literature
discussed in Chapter 2, and discusses actor interests and preferred outcomes in landsliderelated disputes in the context of culture, class, and economics. It discusses the tension
between Seattle’s ‘scientized’ landslide hazard policy and the prominence of values in actor
decision-making, where the implications of science may misalign with the implications of
values. Finally, it provides an outline of limitations and areas of future work.
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Chapter 2 – Theoretical Literature
This project is informed by research that examines the challenges of translating
science and technical knowledge into policies that shape society. Within this body of
literature, which has coalesced under the rubric of S&TS, many scholars argue that scientific
or expert knowledge does not necessarily lead to political consensus or clarity on an
appropriate course of action. Rather, in some contexts, a greater amount of scientific
information may serve to heighten controversy by providing a larger pool of facts and
theories from which sides can then selectively choose (Pielke Jr, 2007; Sarewitz, 2004).
The argument that more quantitative data does not lead to clarity of action, and can
actually result in more controversy, is evident in issues as diverse as climate change,
vaccines, and genetically modified organisms (GMOs). While an overwhelming majority of
the scientific community is in consensus that climate change exists and is human-induced,
the Yale Project on Climate Communication (2014) found that only 64 percent of the
American public believes that climate change exists. Further, both believers and nonbelievers in climate change are growing more certain in their existing beliefs. Similarly,
vaccines are subject to public skepticism, despite extensive scientific assurance of their
safety. Vaccines undergo extensive safety testing, typically of over a decade, and are strongly
recommended by the health community (CDC, 2015). Though 90 percent of American
children do get their primary vaccinations (Reinberg, 2014), some parents choose not to
vaccinate their children, with the number of exemptions slightly rising in many states
(Gavett, 2011). Some parents opt-out due to fears that vaccines will make their children sick,
often citing a long debunked study linking the Measles, Mumps, and Rubella (MMR) vaccine
with autism (CNN, 2011). Others believe that illness is a natural part of life, as expressed by
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many parents in the film Vaccine Wars, which was filmed in a city with a 28 percent rate of
unvaccinated or not-fully vaccinated children (Palfreman, 2010). As is the case with climate
change beliefs, researchers have found that parents who do not vaccinate their children
gravitate even further towards their beliefs when confronted with information meant to
correct misconceptions (Diamond, 2015). Finally, many members of the public have strong
reservations about the safety of ingesting GMO foods (Ferdman, 2015) despite over 2,000
published studies that suggest bio-engineered foods are as safe to consume as conventional
foods (Wendel, 2013). However, opposition to GMOs also stems from values-based concerns
about corporate monopoly of the food system through the patenting of seeds (Nemana, 2012)
or the ‘restructuring’ of food in a way that is not well understood by average citizens (Lynch
& Vogel, 2001). These values-based concerns do not contradict or dismiss science, but find it
irrelevant because it does not, and cannot, address their concerns.
Groups that hold positions conflicting with widespread scientific evidence may
demand that additional scientific studies be performed. They may be convinced that science
supporting a conclusion opposite theirs is flawed and that the results are wrong. The debate
around the safety of using Bisphenol A (BPA) in plastic products well illustrates sustained
public doubt of scientific studies that conclude the opposite of preexisting public opinion.
Numerous studies suggest the sanctioned use of BPA in plastic products does not pose a
health threat to humans, yet the public has been reticent to accept these findings, in part
because a small, but influential, group of journalists, news sites, and NGOs perpetuate the
idea that BPAs are health hazards (Entine, 2012). In 2008, anti-BPA groups demanded that
the Obama administration fund additional studies on the effects of the chemical, claiming
that existing evidence that BPA was safe was insufficient. One of the resulting studies, led by
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the Environmental Protection Agency, concluded that BPA had only weak effects on
endocrine disruption. Anti-BPA groups accused the agency of incorrectly setting up their
experiments and rejected its results (Entine, 2012).
The controversies surrounding climate change, vaccines, BPAs, and GMOs are
current and widely publicized instances of a seeming disconnect between current scientific
knowledge and continued, and even heightened, public mistrust of that scientific knowledge.
Despite scientific information seemingly pointing the public in one direction, much of the
public opinion remains firmly opposed to the seemingly unambiguous outcomes of years of
scientific study. Large bodies of scientific information about these issues have not prevented
polarization about environmental issues.
Daniel Sarewitz (2004), a prominent S&TS scholar, suggests that polarization over
environmental issues is due, in large part, to the ability of an individual to select from the
abundance of “facts assembled via a variety of disciplinary lenses, in ways that can
legitimately support, and are causally indistinguishable from, a range of competing, valuebased political positions” (386). The abundance of information allows anyone to legitimize
his or her position, no matter what contrary evidence indicates. March (1982) characterizes
information as a critical tool with which strategic actors attempt to achieve their goals.
Actors may omit or distort information as a tactic for positively framing their objectives or
for negatively framing others. March describes information as “a symbol of competence”
(39) that has simultaneously lost value due to the systematic manipulation of it.
Both Pielke Jr (2007) and Sarewitz (2004) argue that in politically contentious issues,
opposing sides are often arguing in completely different terms than the other party. Rather
than arguing about verifiable facts, values-based conflicts may be masked as science-based
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arguments. Because conflict of values is not addressed explicitly, more data leads to a moot
point, or political gridlock. Therefore, while some may argue for more science to resolve
disputes, additional scientific studies may fail to produce consensus in action (Pielke Jr,
2007; Sarewitz, 2004). Alternatively, science-based arguments may be pitted against valuesbased arguments. Pielke Jr (2007) demonstrates this type of conflict with the controversy
surrounding stem-cell research in which opposition is based in pro-life rhetoric centered on
the sanctity of life while proponents cite the scientific benefits to the research in treating a
variety of diseases. For opponents, the argument is values-based, and revolves around the
politics of abortion. For proponents, the argument is scientific and practical, centering on
societal benefits and couched in terms of the advancement of scientific knowledge.

The Role of Cultural Values in Disputes
Science-based versus values-based arguments are highly applicable to policies
surrounding landslide regulations. The identification of hazard areas is a scientific process,
which usually involves field-testing and remote surveying techniques. Scientists often
develop estimates of event probabilities based on geologic evidence of past slides and
analysis of environmental triggers like earthquake and rainfall. Scientific data that
demonstrates location and probability of hazards may be used by certain actors to call for
regulations that restrict development in areas prone to slope failures. Yet, values are not
necessarily absent from these science-based arguments. When an individual is arguing
against development, citing potential slope failure, they may be expressing values that
prioritize public safety. Conversely, values-based arguments may counter that it is the
individual’s right to live where he or she pleases, or that development is necessary to support
population growth and that land use in hazard areas should not be heavily regulated.
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The bases on which arguments for and against strict regulation of development in
hazard areas do not inherently contradict each other. For example, someone may agree with
both of the following statements: a) the science is valid in stating that a slope is prone to fail
and b) individuals should have the right to live where they please. However, because
opposing sides do not share the same line of reasoning, strengthening one argument does not
weaken the other. Reconciliation of opposing sides via their respective arguments is therefore
impossible. One cannot challenge the principle of private property rights with geotechnical
reports or slope simulation models.
Public polarization on environmental issues, such as natural hazards, can also be
explained by an individual’s adherence to his or her social or political affiliation. Kahan et al.
(2012) explains that cultural cognition, or the influence of our socio-political values on our
beliefs, influences how people interpret scientific information and can help explain why
scientific controversies are so polarized, despite large bodies of research that often support a
broad scientific consensus. According to Kahan et al. (2012), intelligence and educational
attainment are not good predictors of how well people’s beliefs align with broad scientific
consensus. Rather, people are more concerned with holding the belief that those in their
social network espouse, and rationally so. People may neglect or re-interpret scientific
information in order to maintain the view that will reinforce their social belonging:
For members of the public, being right or wrong about climate- change science will
have no impact. Nothing they do as individual consumers or as individual voters will
meaningfully affect the risks posed by climate change. Yet the impact of taking a
position that conflicts with their cultural group could be disastrous (Kahan, 2012,
255).
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Individuals assessing evidence about environmental hazards are more likely to
conform to the value and belief system of their respective social group; they will interpret
these data in a way that reinforces the existing views of that group.
The importance of social belonging explains why more scientific data may fail to
convince the public of a particular viewpoint. An individual is unlikely to accept sciencebased statements if they are inconsistent with the worldviews and values of the social group
upon which they rely for social and economic support.

The Influence of Societal Structure on Risk Perception
The ideas that Kahan et al. (2012) put forth about cultural adherence draw heavily
from Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982) work on Cultural Theory of risk, which posits that an
individual’s perceptions and responses to risk are heavily dictated by the social paradigm in
which he or she is situated. Cultural Theory characterizes societies by group (from low to
high levels of communitarianism) and grid (from low to high levels of social hierarchy). The
theory asserts that the respective values put forth by these societies, to an extent, molds the
worldviews of individual members. Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) argue that the way in
which an individual understands risk is shaped by the broader moral and social code that
characterizes society. These codes are in turn dependent on the long-term goals of that
society, as well as the sanctioned methods of attaining those goals.
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) outlined four cultural types that theoretically
encompass, to some extent, all cultures throughout history: fatalistic, hierarchic,
individualistic, and egalitarian. Fatalists are characterized by low group and high grid; this
typology tend to believe that ills of the world are involuntary and inevitable, and thus accept
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risks as unavoidable parts of life. Hierarchical cultures are characterized by high group and
grid. This typology depends on institutional order and expertise to guide risk through
rulemaking. Individualists are characterized by low group and grid are concerned most with
preserving individual liberties, especially economic freedom; thus, this typology support
risks that coincide with their goals. Egalitarians, characterized by high group and low grid,
value equality and fairness and often distrust market and government institutions, perceiving
that these exacerbate inequality. Egalitarian culture are often at odds with individualist
cultures because the latter seeks to maximize individual benefit regardless of the expense to
others.
Cultural Theory has been broadly applied since its introduction by Douglas and
Wildavsky (1982) in the early 1980s. Rayner & Cantor (1987) used Cultural Theory
typologies to demonstrate how different organizational settings affects how its members
understand and react to risks of nuclear technology, with particular emphasis on issues of
fairness and equity in risk distribution. The authors conducted interviews in three distinct
organizational settings: utilities companies, public utilities commissions, and public interest
organizations. They found that organizational perspectives on the risks of adopting nuclear
technologies were consistent with an organization’s cultural typology. Public utilities
commissions, for example, were primarily concerned with the economic risks of adopting
nuclear technology, consistent with a market-individualist typology. Public interest groups
were concerned completely with public safety and the question of who might be
disproportionately burdened by risk. Their interests were consistent with an egalitarian
typology — a typology inherently suspicious of individualist and hierarchical systems.
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Wildavsky’s graduate student Karl Dake (1991) tested Cultural Theory using
quantitative analysis at the scale of the individual. Dake used qualitative assessments to
categorize 300 subjects in the San Francisco area into one of the four cultural typologies and
then assessed their risk preferences, hypothesizing that the former would predict the latter.
He found statistically significant correlations between cultural worldview and expected risk
preferences as theorized by Cultural Theory. Individualists were concerned primarily with
economic risk, hierarchical individuals with technological and environmental risk, and
hierarchical individuals with risks related to social disorder.
When Cultural Theory of risk is applied to an issue such as geological hazards,
landslide risk may be highlighted or played down depending on the prevailing goals and
accompanying moral arguments of the society. For example, an individualist society,
characterized by low-group and low-grid, may downplay risk in general, especially if that
risk has negative implications for economic opportunity. What some communities would
perceive as landslide risk, a community with a strong individualist cultural typology may
perceive as a promising source of real estate venture. The goals of profit and market freedom
manifests in a social code critical of regulation, and may be exercised through the reframing
of risk as opportunity. As Beck (1986) argues, because some, such as the individualist in
Douglas’ society type, treat risk as opportunity to profit, antagonism results between those
producing risk and those consuming risk. The characteristics of society types are sometimes
inherently contradictory to one another. A society exhibiting strong egalitarian typology, for
example, may highlight environmental risks as a symptom of distrust of industry, a
philosophy that directly conflicts with that of an individualist typology (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982).
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One of the primary critiques of Cultural Theory is that it ignores individual agency in
risk perception and is overly deterministic in predicting how individuals will act based on
their cultural context. Gross & Rayner (1985) argue that Cultural Theory does not account
for why certain individuals, based upon personality or personal experience, may prefer one
typology over another. Furthermore, Rayner (1992) believes that individuals may even
adhere to different typologies depending on social context and are not necessarily consistent
in acting within a specific typology. Ostrander (1982) too is critical of categorizing entire
societies into a single typology, arguing that Cultural Theory is more useful for identifying
social contexts.

Scientists and Values
While cultural theorists stress the role of values expressed by a society in the way that
individuals perceive and make decisions about risk, some argue that values may also play a
significant role in the way that scientists present information to the public and to
policymakers. Pielke Jr (2007) distinguishes four theoretical modes of scientific
communication: Issue Advocate, Pure Scientist, Science Arbiter, and Honest Policy Broker.
Issue Advocates are politically interested actors who present scientific information in such a
way as to limit the scope of options to those consistent with their political leanings. Pure
Scientists have no personal or political interest in decision-making outcomes, and thus
provide broadly relevant information without concern for how it is used. Science Arbiters act
as on-call resources for decision-makers and only provide information for which the
decision-maker asks. Honest Policy Brokers aim to provide decision-makers with all possible
options as well as relevant information about each option, an approach that attempts to
maximize the scope of options. What Pielke Jr (2007) terms “Stealth Advocacy” (7) occurs
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when Issue Advocates present themselves as Pure Scientists, attempting to conceal political
interests with claims of scientific objectivity. Stealth Advocacy is the fifth mode of science
communication, and results in scientists limiting the scope of policy options in a way that
favors their individual political views or values, potentially damaging public perceptions of
scientific integrity. Pielke Jr (2007) believes there is a legitimate place in science for all four
types of scientists he originally outlines if scientists are open about what role they have
chosen to play. Stealth Advocates, by definition, are dishonest, or at least not forthright about
their mode of operation. For Pielke Jr, scientists can act as Issue Advocates, limiting policy
options in way that furthers their agenda, so long as they do not claim to be something other
than an Issue Advocate.
In extreme cases, scientists may use their credentials to further their interests or the
interests of others, in spite of science. The most notable example of this is the decades-long
denial of the link between smoking and cancer by scientists working with the tobacco
industry, as illustrated by Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway in Merchants of Doubt. By
focusing on what existing studies did not explain, for example the differential rates of cancer
between cities, scientists working with the tobacco industry successfully created and
sustained substantial doubt about the health effects of tobacco use for decades after causal
links between smoking and lung cancer, bronchitis, coronary heart disease, and other
diseases had been established (Oreskes & Conway, 2011). The cases described in Merchants
of Doubt demonstrate a case of extreme Stealth Advocacy, in which scientists are politically
inclined to the extent that science is ignored and misinterpreted in order to further an ulterior
agenda.
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Oreskes & Conway (2011) demonstrate how even small margins of uncertainty or
unexplained details can be strategically exaggerated to the extent that it muddies the public’s
understanding of the issue. That scientists are the ones challenging existing evidence lends
legitimacy to otherwise unwarranted doubt, at least in the eyes of the public. Prior to 1985,
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) required that the media had to provide
coverage to ‘both sides of the debate’ under the Fairness Doctrine. Established in 1949, the
Fairness Doctrine was meant to ensure viewer access to diverse viewpoints in a time when
channels were more limited. Though intended for broadcast media, the Fairness Doctrine was
practiced in print journalism as well. While perhaps an appropriate strategy for providing
contrasting political views, the Fairness Doctrine served as a basis upon which minority
scientific viewpoints could be expressed publicly. As Oreskes and Conway argue, the
concept of covering ‘both sides’ is inappropriate for scientific issues because:
[S]cience is not about opinion. It is about evidence. It is about claims that can be, and
have been, tested through scientific research – experiments, experience, and
observation – research that is then subject to critical review by a jury of scientific
peers. Claims that have not gone through that process – or have gone through it and
failed – are not scientific, and do not deserve equal time in a scientific debate (32).

Merchants of Doubt documents an extreme case of Stealth Advocacy, as described by
Pielke Jr (2007). Cases in which scientists are deliberately obscuring well-established
evidence to their own ends are a form of extremism that no doubt infuriates others within the
scientific community. How politically-aligned scientists can successfully lead campaigns of
misinformation, even when evidence overwhelmingly contradicts their claims, can be
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explained at least partially by the perception of science as ‘objective,’ and the resulting trust
in those who wield the label ‘scientist.’ If society perceive science as infallible, then those
who study and ‘do’ science may be perceived as intermediaries of ‘truth.’
Public Skepticism of Science
The regulatory process in the United States depends heavily upon science and
scientists to operate due to its supposed objectivity (Jasanoff, 1990). Yet, as Oreskes and
Conway demonstrate, our trust in quantitative sciences as impartial can allow room for
politically based claims by scientists speaking outside their areas of expertise to be given fair
consideration by the public. Such trust in quantification, and those who quantify, is a
relatively new reality for the Western world.
Porter (1995) argues that use of clinical, quantitative, and replicable processes within
decision-making have precluded the need for face-to-face interactions with experts and
decision-makers, which was the original form of trust building. The use of ‘objective’
processes and peer-review are meant to ensure that no biases influence decisions that affect
our lives. Thus, quantification and its assumed companion ‘objectivity,’ are key components
in decision-making processes in a society that is premised on fairness and equality. So long
as science is perceived to operate on norms of objectivity, society sees science as a legitimate
foundation, even a privileged foundation, for making arguments about risk, no matter what
ulterior motives exist for making such an argument. Similarly, scientists and other
professionals that are perceived as using ‘pure’ and ‘unbiased’ quantitative methods enjoy,
for the most part, a higher level of authority and legitimacy than those making arguments
based upon opinion, social connections, and emotion. This cloak of authority extends by
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association to even scientists and other professionals who may be taking on advocacy
positions as theorized in Pielke’s Issue Advocate and Stealth Advocate roles of scientists.
Though high trust in quantitative sciences may allow scientists acting as Stealth
Advocates to lend legitimacy to mass misinformation campaigns, as described by Oreskes &
Conway (2011), trust in quantification is far from a misguided inclination. The scientific
process is designed to heighten certainty through successively disproving alternative
explanations, particularly through the mechanism of peer review. In itself, the scientific
process is highly trustworthy when viewed over long time periods. However, a problem
arises when individuals who are associated with this trustworthy process do not follow
scientific protocol in a genuine manner in order to further their own interests. Even slight
Issue Advocacy may paint scientists as overly interested, subjective actors (Pielke, Jr, 2007).
Politically interested scientists can potentially undermine public trust in science as an
empirical and generally objective mechanism of discovery and serve to de-legitimize
scientific and technical expertise.
Indeed, many argue that trust in scientific institutions is waning, though diverse
explanations for this exist. Jasanoff (1990) in The Fifth Branch demonstrates that floundering
trust in science, and specifically science advisory committees in the United States, may be
due to a slow revelation that scientists are not wholly objective or impartial. With the
growing power of regulatory agencies in the United States from the 1970s onward, reliance
upon scientific advisory committees became increasingly codified in regulatory decisionmaking. Jasanoff (1990) demonstrates that the public questions the role of these scientific
advisory committees, as well as the way in which science is used to make regulatory
decisions, as biased and value-ridden. As Jasanoff and other social constructionists of science
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argue, the impartial, depoliticized scientific advisory committee cannot operate the way it is
idealized to do. Scandals in the 1970s and 1980s involving scientific misconduct on the part
of allegedly biased regulatory agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) contributed to widespread distrust of how science is
used to inform federal regulation (Jasanoff, 1990). The rise of the term ‘junk science’ as a
figurative label, as opposed to its sanctioned definition within the science community for
scientific studies that are deemed biased or overly prescriptive, may also indicate that the
public and media are losing trust in scientific institutions (Herrick & Jamieson, 2001).

‘How Fair is Safe Enough?’
While straying from the scientific process in regulatory decisions may heighten
public distrust of scientists at the helm of decision-making, distrust may also be rooted in the
systems of power in which decisions about risk are made. Rayner & Cantor (1987) claimed
that “the critical question facing societal risk managers is not ‘How safe is safe enough?’ but
‘How fair is safe enough?’”(3). Citizens, they argue, are less concerned with probabilistic
models of risk and magnitude used by experts to communicate their findings on hazards.
Rather, society is concerned with issues of trust, liability, and equity and is more likely to
respond positively to a hazard if institutions can incorporate hazards into a society in a
morally acceptable way (Rayner & Cantor, 1987; Jasanoff, 1996).
In the United States, the ideals of fairness and equality are social emphasized through
mechanisms for citizen expression. Public participation and access to knowledge are
cornerstones of the democratic ideal in the United States, and institutionalized through The
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), forums for public grievances, and the litigation process.
Informed public participation is considered a way in which citizens can join the decision-
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making process and gives scientists and decision-makers a “license to operate” (Rayner,
2003, p. 165). Theoretically, public participation operates as a system of checks and balances
in which an informed and active citizenry oversees the conduct of experts and decisionmakers and protests any policies that are not in the best interest of the individual or society.
For example, if a local jurisdiction in Washington State passes an ordinance that restricts
hillside development and a homeowner feels that the regulation unfairly burdens her, she has
the right to file a lawsuit against the jurisdiction or appeal to the Growth Management
Hearings Board to argue that the ordinance is not consistent with state law. Alternatively, she
may argue that the geotechnical or scientific report that informs the ordinance is
questionable.
Jasanoff (1996) warns that increased public participation in science and decisionmaking may lead to more dispute, similar to the way in which it is argued that more science
leads to more controversy (Pielke Jr, 2007; Sarewitz, 2004). The political framework and
information culture of the United States is premised on public participation and data
availability, and governments have increasingly integrated mechanisms for public
participation in policy with the help of social scientists (Rayner, 2003). Though the goal of
participation in decision-making is to close information gaps and exercise the public will,
Jasanoff (1996) argues that in reality, participation does not automatically unveil a clear
decision. Rather, a greater volume of active stakeholders will produce “discord and
confusion” (65). In her opinion, the homeowner in the previous example will put forth but
one of many possible opinions of the ordinance. Other citizens may that counter that the
ordinance is progressive, and that they do not want their tax dollars to be spent on cleanup

24
efforts if the homeowner’s property is destroyed by a landslide. The sheer volume of
different opinions on the matter may inhibit any meaningful action at all.

Implications for Regulation of Landslide Hazard
ST&S theories suggest that the relationship between scientific information and
landslide hazard policy is complex. The existence of hazard information may not necessarily
lead to straightforward hazard policies that directly respond to that science. Instead, values,
such as property rights, beautiful views, or economic development, may play a bigger role in
formulating a community’s perception of, and response to, risk and the policy that follows
When the implications of hazard information conflict with a community’s values-based
preferences for policy, that scientific information may be rejected as false, biased, or it may
be outright avoided in favor of information, scientific or otherwise, that supports preexisting
opinions about what type of policies ought to exist. The public may more readily dismiss
science that conflicts with their values, because its reputation as a nonpartisan and objective
process has been weakened by the perceived advocacy and bias of some scientists. The next
chapter turns to landslide risk in Seattle, Washington, summarizing technical studies of this
natural hazard and the regulatory process that has evolved to manage exposure to it.
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Chapter 3 – Landslide Characteristics
This chapter examines the history of landslide risk and regulatory management of this
risk in Seattle, Washington, a city where geographic features of lake, sea, river, hillsides, and
bluffs have intersected with rapid urban development. Before examining landslide regulation
and policy in Seattle and the disputes that arise from them in Chapter 4, it is necessary to
understand what a landslide is, and where landslide risk exists. This chapter will review the
physical characteristics of landslides, Seattle’s landslide risk, and landslide triggers.
Broadly defined, a landslide is the downward displacement of earth material on a
slope by the force of gravity. While the term ‘landslide’ categorically includes rock falls and
other types of rock movement, most of the landslides I will refer to in this thesis involve the
failure of unconsolidated materials such as soils and glacial deposits characteristic of Seattle
(Shannon & Wilson, 2000).
Though landslides occur in every U.S. state, mountainous regions see a higher rate of
incidence due to their steep topography. Washington state, home to the Cascade and Olympic
mountain ranges, is one of the most landslide prone states in the country (DNR, 2016).
Scientists do not agree upon a single index to measure landslide ‘magnitude,’ which
describes the strength or power of an event (Tobin & Montz, 1997). Media typically describe
landslides to the public in terms of the variables of velocity and volume of displacement.
Both give a vague sense of ‘magnitude’ and are widely understood concepts. In the case of
the Oso landslide of 2014, a commonly reported statistic was the ‘landslide area’ of one
square mile, a reference to the ground vicinity that had ultimately been covered in debris
post-impact (Ravindran, 2014). Though not a scientific index of magnitude, ‘landslide area’
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provided a generalized notion of the landslide’s massiveness that rudimentarily combined
volume displaced with spatial extent.
The duration of a landslide varies enormously depending on the event. A landslide is,
in its essential definition, the force of gravity outweighing the mechanics of the materials
holding it on a slope (e.g. mechanical friction and soil cohesion) (Olshansky, 1996). Failure
can be a very quick process or a very long one, such as the case of soil creep, which is
detectable only to a trained eye (Wold & Jochim, 1989). Even in what appears to be a ‘quick’
landslide, the underlying conditions that created it may have been in formation for much
longer. Duration may be considered in terms of the event itself, or its triggering conditions.
According to Tobin and Montz (1997):
Landslides and debris flows represent events that usually have a very short duration
of impact, but a long period of onset. . . . [W]hile the slide itself may take only
minutes, the antecedent conditions may have been building for hours, days weeks, or
even years.

Debris displacement in a landslide can be in the range of a few meters or a few
kilometers depending on extent of slope failure and the number of failures that occurred
(Crozier & Glade, 2005). Tobin and Montz (1997) describe landslides as “spatially limited in
extent,” but with the condition that the event is individual and isolated. Any mass triggering
event such as an earthquake or widespread rainfall will affect more than one susceptible
slope. Under the right conditions, an entire region may be at risk for landslides if topography
is consistent and exposed to the same conditions.
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Landslide speed is extremely variable. A landslide can move as slow as a couple of
millimeters a year, or exceed speeds of 90 meters per second (USGS, 2014). In the case of
very slow movements, landmass tends to move incrementally over time, which can
complicate surveillance efforts and, in the context of early-warning systems, require
improved techniques for measurement (Crozier & Glade, 2005).
It is difficult to assign frequency predictions to landslide events, as they are often the
product of a combination of factors including a trigger event such as an earthquake or a high
amount of rainfall. Scientists have instead turned to determining areas of risk where
landslides may occur under a certain combination of events (OAS, 1991). Experts can create
susceptibility maps that meet conditions of probability. Typically, these areas of risk will
have experienced previous landslides and are at risk of being exposed to a triggering event,
such as an earthquake, heavy rainfall, or human-induced landscape changes (Wold & Jochim,
1989). It may then be possible to determine the likelihood of a certain combination of
variables converging and producing landsliding. This is often done with rainfall threshold
analysis but cannot be done with other triggering events such as earthquakes, which are
difficult to predict outside long-term recurrence intervals (Glade, 1998; OAS, 1991; USGS,
2013).

Landslides in Seattle
Washington state has one of the highest rate of landslides in the United States (DNR,
2016). In Seattle, landslide risk is a function of its geologic conditions, its wet winters, its
earthquake susceptibility, and its dense development. Over eight percent of the city’s area is
classified as either known landslide, which indicates past movement, or potential landslide,
which indicates probable future movement (Seattle Office of Emergency Management,
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2014). The City classifies steep slopes with slopes 40 percent or higher as landslide-prone;
when these slopes are considered, GIS analysis of Seattle’s publicly available ECA data
shows that around 13 percent of the city’s area is classified as either landslide-prone, steep
slope, or both. Much of the landslide risk is concentrated in Seattle’s coastal areas along
Puget Sound and Lake Washington, but some inland risk also exists. Figure 1 depicts
landslide risk and indicates neighborhoods mentioned in this thesis.
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Figure 1 – Publically available data depicts landslide-prone areas, which includes known
slide areas, potential slide areas, and steep slope areas. This data was last updated in 2001
by Shannon & Wilson. The original data was used for SEPA purposes.
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The geologic processes that produced Seattle’s slide-prone landscape well predate
human settlement in the area. Tectonic and volcanic activity, combined with the scouring and
movement of material by glaciers, primarily shaped the landscape. In the past 2.4 million
years, the Puget Lowland between the Cascade and Olympic ranges, has been subject to
repeated glaciation, the last of which receded about 13,000 years ago (Troost & Booth,
2008). Upon glacial retreat, an array of silt, sand, clay, and gravel was deposited along
Seattle’s Puget coastal bluffs, creating a landslide-prone consistency of sand overlying clay.
During periods of heavy or continuous rain, water penetrates the sand layer but collects upon
the impermeable clay layer. As the weight of water builds, and pore pressure elevates in the
sand, the sand layer may collapses in a landslide. This particularly landslide-prone
combination of sand and clay is found along the coastline in Magnolia and West Seattle,
where a majority of the city’s landslides occur (Shipman, 2001).
The ‘Seattle Landslide Study’ by Shannon & Wilson (2000) identified shallowcolluvial slides and deep-seated slides as the most commonly occurring landslide types in
Seattle. Shallow-colluvial slides, comprising 68 percent of landslides in Seattle, occur when
large quantities of water permeate a layer of loose, sandy material and dislodge it from the
slope. The saturated debris often moves rapidly, on average reaching velocities of between
13 and 22 meters per second (USGS, 2014). Shallow-colluvial landslide risk is heavily
concentrated in West Seattle, Magnolia, and areas along Lake Washington (Harp et al.,
2006).
Deep-seated landslides, which comprise 20 percent of landslides in Seattle, involve
deeper failure points causing the movement of large blocks of material. Typically, the
displacement of one block of debris will trigger further debris block displacement on the
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slope. Deep-seated landslide risk is most concentrated in West Seattle and Magnolia
(Shannon & Wilson, 2000). Both deep-seated and shallow landslides are often triggered by
slope saturation, from either heavy precipitation, surface runoff, or rising groundwater levels.

Landslide Triggers
Landslides are caused by a multitude of factors that include both the physical
characteristics of the landscape such as the type of geologic deposit, which determines
material strength, vegetation cover, and slope angle, and triggering forces such as human
ground disturbance, rainfall, earthquake, and toe erosion by water currents and waves, which
will become a larger concern as sea levels rise. Landslides are produced by a combination of
these factors.
Rainfall. In periods of high intensity and continuous rainfall, slopes are weakened
and much more susceptible to sliding (Godt et al., 2008). Both deep-seated and shallow
colluvial landslides can be triggered by heavy precipitation. Seattle’s annual rainfall is
concentrated in November through April, a period considered the local wet season. During
these months, the city sees an average of 711 mm, nearly three times the average rainfall in
its dry months (Chleborad et al., 2008). Most of Seattle’s landslides occur in January, after
concentrated precipitation in months prior (Shannon & Wilson, 2000) In the winter of 1996
to 1997, Seattle experienced high amounts of precipitation with 191 percent of average
rainfall in December (USGS, 1998). The city subsequently experienced one of its worse
landslide seasons in recent history with nearly 300 landslides reported (Long, 2000;
Shipman, 2001).
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The USGS (2011) uses two two-variable models to predict the occurrence of
landslides; 3-day cumulative precipitation to 15-day cumulative precipitation preceding 3day window and average rainfall intensity per hour to rainfall duration (Chleborad et al.,
2008; Godt et al., 2008). If variables exceed thresholds in either model, landslides are more
likely to occur. The USGS website dynamically updates weather conditions into each model
to demonstrate current landslide risk. For example, as of March 2016, the Seattle-Tacoma
airport area had exceeded the threshold based on cumulative 3-day and 15-day precipitation.
Earthquake. Earthquakes can cause widespread shaking and therefore may trigger
landslides on a regional scale by shaking soil, rocks, and other earth material loose from
bedrock. In some cases, resulting landslides can be just as deadly and as damaging as the
earthquake itself. After China’s 2008 Sichuan earthquake, landslides and rockfalls alone
caused an estimated 20,000 deaths (Yin et. al, 2009). Severe ground disturbance can also
create new landslide hazard zones that have the potential to cause future damage.
Earthquake risk in Seattle and the Pacific Northwest is substantial. Washington has
the third highest earthquake risk in the United States after Alaska and California (USGS,
2012). The northwestern coastline of the United States is paralleled by the Cascadia
Subduction Zone, an area beneath the ocean where the Juan de Fuca plate subducts
underneath the North American plate (CREW, 2013). When enough strain builds between the
convergent crusts, Juan de Fuca will push further underneath its counterpart, creating a
massive earthquake projected to be moment magnitude (Mw) 8 or higher. While such events
are rare, with current calculations of a return period of approximately 500 years for a full
fault rupture, a Cascadia earthquake is expected to cause extensive landsliding in coastal
areas throughout the Pacific Northwest. Planners anticipate it to block critical transportation
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routes and possibly produce local tsunami events triggered by large landslides (CREW,
2005).
Seattle is also exposed to a number of shallow seismogenic faults throughout the
region, including one directly below its downtown area, which is known as the Seattle Fault.
The shallow faults in the Puget lowland are capable of producing earthquakes of around 6 to
7.5Mw (CREW, 2009). The Seattle Fault last produced an earthquake around 1,100 years
ago, which scientists approximate had a magnitude of a 7.5Mw (ten Brink et al., 2006).
Geologic evidence suggests that that earthquake sent entire hillsides and the accompanying
forest into Lake Washington (CREW, 2009). Another Seattle Fault earthquake may reach the
same magnitude, though lower magnitudes between 6 and 7Mw are more probable. The
probability of experiencing an earthquake from the Seattle fault zone over 6.5 Mw in a 50year period is 5 percent, while the probability of experiencing an earthquake from any
shallow fault in the Puget Sound area in a 50-year period is 15 percent (Ballantyne et al.,
2005).
Allstadt et al. (2013) modeled seismically induced landsliding in a 7.0 Mw Seattle
Fault scenario and found that over a third of landslides likely to occur are outside of the
landslide-prone areas currently demarcated by the City. The model predicts the earthquake
will produce 30,000 landslides under very wet conditions, and 5,000 under dry conditions,
highlighting the importance of considering the many factors that contribute to landsliding.
Human Influences. Approximately 80 percent of recorded landslides in Seattle have
been caused in part by human activity (Shannon & Wilson, 2003). However, Laprade &
Tubbs (2008) note that landslides that do not endanger property are less likely to be reported,
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and thus the apparently high proportion of human-influenced landslides may be an
overestimate.
Since officials began keeping landslide records in 1890, the frequency of landslides in
Seattle has increased nearly every decade, due in part to the acceleration and extent of
development (Seattle Office of Emergency Management, 2014). Development of housing,
roads, and other infrastructure can be deleterious to the stability of a slope and may induce
landslides under the right conditions. In general, excavating or filling a slope, poorly
designing a drainage system or removing vegetation heightens the risk of landslide (Wold &
Jochim, 1989; Crozier & Glade, 2005). However, many argue that in some areas, developing
impervious surfaces and other structural improvements reduce existing landslide risk
(Laprade & Tubbs, 2008). For example, development of seawalls or other types of barriers
along the majority of Seattle’s coastlines have protected the toes of slopes from wave action,
and prevented landsliding (Godt et al., 2008; Laprade & Tubbs, 2008). Methods for
engineering in a manner that lessens risk, and even stabilizes landslide-prone slopes, exist,
yet much development in urbanized areas precedes the codification of such methods. As a
result, older infrastructure may have been developed in a way that that puts strain on slopes,
and heightens landslide risk.
Seattle’s landslide risk is the product of its geological history and its exposure to
trigger mechanisms, including heavy rainfall, earthquake, and human activity. Seattle’s
population has struggled to understand and mitigate its landslide risk since European
settlement, with officials documenting landslide events since 1890. Despite many major
landslide events in the first half of the twentieth century, it was not until the 1970s that
Seattle began to develop a hazard regulatory framework.
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Chapter 4 – Regulating landslide hazard areas
This chapter discusses Seattle’s gradual development of its regulatory framework for
addressing landslide hazard risk. It details the period prior to the enactment of the federal and
state laws that propelled the creation of more robust hazard regulations at the local level,
details the development of Seattle’s Environmentally Critical Areas regulations, and provides
an overview of those regulations in their current form.
Olshansky (1998) outlines four perspectives on development in landslide hazard areas
that often coexist, sometimes conflictingly, in land use policy. Each perspective is held by a
different actor who may advise local government. The first is the aesthetic perspective, often
touted by architects and developers, which views the hillside as an opportunity for creative
real estate development. This perspective rarely considers public safety. As Olshansky
argues, “Hillside residences often have been designed to soar above the slope, to accentuate
the sense of danger and discovery, rather than to adapt to the hillside’s constraints” (385).
The second perspective considers hillside development in the context of public safety, and it
is often supported by geologists and some engineers. The public safety perspective advocates
diligent hazard mapping and responsive engineering solutions to mitigate the hazard.
Because mitigation could call for risk elimination through mass grading, which involves the
removal or fill of large amounts of ground material, this perspective is at odds with the
aesthetic perspective, which frames the hillside as a canvas for architectural creativity. The
third perspective, often espoused by landscape architects, combines aesthetic concerns with
regard for the ecological functions of the hillside, though Olshansky argues that concern for
the aesthetic and for the environmental are rarely integrated effectively. The fourth
perspective, which is that of planners, attempts to reconcile many perspectives into land use
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policy through the implementation of slope-density regulation. Slope-density regulation,
which requires lower density development on steeper slopes serves multiple perspectives.
This regulatory approach serves the aesthetic perspective by precluding invasive mitigation
methods, such as mass grading that may have been necessary for higher density
development. Yet it also serves the public safety perspective by minimizing development in
areas considered hazardous.
Seattle’s current approach to hillside development emphasizes the public safety
perspective and environmental protection. Current policy and regulatory frameworks in
Seattle, including the comprehensive plan and municipal code, recognize government
responsibility for maintaining the health of critical areas and the safety of those living within
or adjacent to them, as stated in their purposes. The government’s primary tool for fulfilling
this responsibility is through review and regulation of land use on steep slopes that goes
beyond regulation of development elsewhere. However, as will be discussed, the government
throughout much of the twentieth century lacked the regulatory power it has today to prohibit
or limit hillside development. During much of Seattle’s development, the responsibility of
ensuring sound construction was borne by developers, who Seattle land-use attorney Richard
Settle argues were incautious of landslide hazards:
[D]evelopers have paid little heed to topography and subsurface geology, soil
permeability and steepness of slopes, flood plains, surface drainage and groundwater.
. . . By the time houses slid down slopes or were swept away by floodwaters, septic
tanks ceased functioning or wells became polluted, the subdivider had sold out and
moved on (Settle, 1983).
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Lack of a robust regulatory framework for guiding development in hazard areas resulted in
building stock susceptible to landslide hazard, which set the stage for several major landslide
events throughout the twentieth century.
Seattle has landslide records dating back to 1890. Black and white photographs
depicting tilted houses and collapsed hillsides at the turn of the century can be found in its
municipal archives. An 1897 letter from a city engineer to the city attorney indicates early
attempts to mitigate landslide risk along shorelines by building retaining walls and covering
slopes with impervious surfaces (Laprade & Tubbs, 2008). While early residents of the city
maintained a cultural understanding of landslide risk through experience, comprehensive
scientific data that could delineate where risk was high, and where it was low, was not yet
available.
When hillsides failed, the public typically considered the government liable, charging
it with neglecting drainage systems or improperly building public infrastructure. After heavy
rains triggered citywide landsliding in the winter of 1933-34, the City was sued for a total of
over $600,000 (nearly $11 million in 2016 dollars) by homeowners alleging the City had
failed to maintain its drainage systems (Maier, 1997a). As lawsuits were pending, the City
successfully petitioned the Federal Civil Works Administration and state’s emergency relief
agency for aid, which funded over thirty landslide mitigation projects in the city over the next
two years (Laprade & Tubbs, 2008). Mitigation projects focused heavily on developing
drainage infrastructure, particularly on Perkins Lane in Magnolia, which sits on a bluff
overlooking the Puget Sound. In total, the City spent around $1.5 million in landslide
prevention efforts on Perkins Lane after the 1933-34 landslides, while development
continued on the bluff unabated (Maier, 1997b). A historical photograph, shown in Figure 2,
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depicts a real estate sign in 1938 that reads ‘Best Buy. Best View on Perkins Lane. NO
SLIDES. Civil engineer says...Good condition to build on.’ The sign’s emphasis on ‘no
slides’ attests to the notoriety of the landslide hazard on Perkins Lane, as well as the reliance
upon technical specialists, rather than regulatory restrictions, when evaluating landslide risk.

Figure 2 This 1938 real estate sign was photographed on Perkins Lane in Magnolia, a street
considered Seattle’s ‘poster child’ for landslide risk. Homes on the street would undergo
repeated damage from landslides, the most famous of them a slow moving slide between
1996 and 1997, which sent six homes down the bluff. Courtesy of Seattle Municipal Archives,
Item 12194
In the winter of 1942, Perkins Lane slid again. That same winter, a landslide on East
Boston Terrace in Capitol Hill pushed a home 750 feet down a ravine, killing Ruth Grapp,
and seriously injuring her husband. The Capitol Hill landslide had not come without warning;
city officials had come to warn the couple of slope instability under their home just days
before the slope failed. One year prior, another landslide had destroyed the house of another
East Boston Terrace resident (Maier, 1997b).
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In response to the landslide under the Grapp property, as well as to landsliding under
Perkins Lane, the City Council proposed prohibiting construction on slopes known to be
hazardous. This proposal was almost immediately retracted after city lawyers advised the
Council that such a regulation would result in lawsuits from property rights proponents, in
addition to the existing lawsuits alleging city liability for landslide damages. Government
regulation of hillside development directly contradicted a conventional conception of
individual property rights that supposed a homeowner should be able to build on the land he
owned, regardless of risk. As City Attorney A.C. Van Soelen remarked in response to the
failed Seattle proposal:
You would, in effect, be telling a property owner who presumably had investigated
and satisfied himself, perhaps with engineering advice, he could build safely, that you
dispute his judgment and won't permit him to do what he wants with his own property
(Maier, 1997b).

While failing to pass development restrictions on steep slopes, the City Council did require
that residents on Perkins Lane sign a covenant acknowledging the slide-risk on their
properties (Nelson & Ostrom, 1997).

Transition into Regulation
The State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) provided Seattle with its first tool for
monitoring development in hazard-prone areas. The passages of the National Environmental
Policy Act in 1969 at the federal level and SEPA in Washington state in 1971 reflected a
growing regional and national concern for the environment, as well as a recognition that
jurisdictions lacked the legal tools to address these concerns. The SEPA review process,
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which is still in effect, required that a project applicant complete an environmental checklist
evaluating potential impacts of his or her proposal and detailing strategies to mitigate for
those impacts. Based on the applicant’s checklist, the lead agency either required an
Environmental Impact Statement or issued a Determination of Nonsignificance. The results
of the SEPA process served to inform permit decisions, but had no regulatory weight per se.
In effect, reliance on SEPA to regulate development in critical areas vested substantial trust
in the developer. Developers could build in a steep slope or landslide-prone area so long as
they assured the city they would use sound construction techniques and that they
acknowledged the risk of building on the site (Associated Press, 1986; Ho, 1996).
In 1984, Director’s Rule 7-84 laid out the city’s first set of regulations for developing
in landslide-prone areas. The rule required that applicant’s submit topographic surveys and
hire geotechnical consultants to do site and stability evaluations for landslide-prone areas
before a permit was granted. The City also hired its first geotechnical engineer to review
these evaluations and conduct site visits, if necessary. At the time, these standards were
considered stringent in comparison to those enforced in other jurisdictions in King County,
many of which experienced similar landslide risk (Balter, 1986).
In 1990, the State legislature passed the Growth Management Act (GMA), which
directs jurisdictions to develop comprehensive plan policies and codes that address the
protection of critical areas, which are areas considered environmentally valuable or
hazardous to human safety. Though the GMA did not require jurisdictions to amend their
policies until the following year, the City Council passed an emergency ordinance to adopt
interim environmentally critical areas (ECA) regulations, which regulate development in
hazardous and other environmentally sensitive areas, as a placeholder until permanent ones
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could be developed. The interim ECA regulations, which required that a certain percentage
of a lot in a wetland or on a steep slope remain undeveloped, were met with protest from
many developers, who worried the regulations would render many properties less
developable. However, the regulations were widely supported by many residents of slideprone neighborhoods who often bore the cost of stabilizing slopes themselves (Nelson,
1990). The interim regulations were replaced with permanent ECA regulations in 1992,
which clarified and strengthened the interim regulations.

Shifts in Policy
In 1995, a developer sued the City after the Department of Construction and
Inspections (DCI) denied him an ECA exception, which would have allowed him to bypass
the requirement that 30 percent of the steep slope area on his property be left undeveloped. A
Superior Court judge ruled in the applicant’s favor, reasoning that development on more than
the allowed portion of the slope would serve to stabilize it, and that enforcement of the 30
percent rule would heighten risk. Though the judge’s ruling only applied to the applicant’s
property, city officials feared that the precedence set by the case would invite future lawsuits
based in the same argument. In response, ECA regulations for steep slope and landslideprone areas were amended so that DCI could exempt projects from regulations that, if
applied, would inhibit stabilization of a slope. A geotechnical engineer for DCI remarked to
the Seattle Times the following year that, despite reviewing more development proposals in
landslide-prone areas, “We basically have to see a fatal flaw that we're willing to go to the
mat for if we're not going to grant a permit” (Paulson, 1997). Effectively, the outcome of the
lawsuit budged the City into allowing almost any development proposal on a steep slope that
was backed by geotechnical expertise.
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In the winter of 1996-97, Western Washington experienced heavy rainfall that
resulted in nearly 300 landslides throughout Seattle; these landslides damaged nearly 100
properties. On nearby Bainbridge Island, a family of four was killed when their home fell
down a slope and into the Puget Sound in the middle of the night. That fatal and highly
publicized landslide, along with landslide damages to public and private property in Seattle
totaling over $100 million, prompted the City Council to enact a 90-day moratorium on
development in hillside areas while they investigated damages and considered whether
current regulations were sufficient (Conklin, 1999). Though most damage to private property
was found to be on lots developed prior to the passage of ECA regulations in 1990, the extent
of the damage propelled the City to consider a new approach to its landslide policy that
focused on public outreach and a better scientific and spatial understanding of landslide
hazard.
The City worked with the United States Geological Survey (USGS), Seattle
geotechnical firm Shannon & Wilson, and University of Washington geologists to produce
new landslide hazard maps for the city that could inform future policy. The Shannon &
Wilson ‘Seattle Landslide Study,’ which was published in 2000 and updated in 2003
(Shannon & Wilson, 2000; Shannon & Wilson, 2003), detailed landslide risk based on
analysis of Seattle’s historical landslide records, consulting records, and field tests. The study
provided recommendations for remedial action. In 2006, the USGS published a series of
landslide risk maps and models that depicted susceptibility to different types of landslides
under variable weather conditions, including an overall landslide recurrence interval and
probability map that was made public. The use of historical landslide analysis and LiDAR, a
remote laser-based surveying technology, produced more precise risk maps that depicted four
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times the amount of landslide than had been depicted in previous maps (Schultz, 2005). In
response to the publication of both the Shannon & Wilson and USGS studies, Seattle in 2006
updated its ECA regulations to codify the new hazard maps into decision-making, changing
the definition of a landslide-prone area in the Seattle Municipal Code to include those areas
mapped by the Shannon & Wilson study. DCI also made amendments to conditions for
building in ECA areas. It began enforcing Director’s Rule 32-2006, which requires additional
Letters of Certification from geotechnical engineers that ensure no conditions have changed
on landslide-prone sites between the issuance of a permit and commencement of
construction. It also placed more restrictions on altering vegetation or trees in landslide-prone
areas.
2014 Oso Landslide. The 2014 Oso landslide in Snohomish County re-sparked the
regional conversation about landslide risk and appropriate policies for addressing that risk.
Though the focus of the debate was on the regulatory framework for hazard mitigation in
unincorporated Snohomish County, policymakers at the state level were also pressured to
reconsider their role in creating risk-averse policy through data provision. The Department of
Natural Resources provides geographically limited statewide landslide data to the public,
which is often used by jurisdictions, sometimes in conjunction with local data, to inform
hazard policies.
After the Oso slide, Governor Jay Inslee signed Senate Bill 5088, which allotted $4.6
million to statewide landslide hazard mapping using LiDAR. Supporters of the Bill hoped
that with access to precise landslide hazard data throughout the state, jurisdictions would be
better equipped to prevent ‘another Oso.’ Seattle, for its part, published LiDAR based
landslide-hazard maps of the city in 2006, a product of the effort to better understand
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landslide risk after the 1996-97 landslide season. Though Seattle officials made minor
amendments to its ECA regulations in 2014, no fundamental changes were made directly due
to the Oso event. A government planner said, “[T]he changes that we’re making are not
because of Oso, because we feel like we do a good job already.” The city’s planners
considered its approach to hillside development sufficient under its current regulatory
framework, a framework summarized below.

Current Regulatory Framework
Seattle Municipal Code (the Code) Section 25.09 Regulations guide development in
areas considered at risk for landslide as part of designated Environmentally Critical Areas
(ECAs). ECA regulations control development in areas prone to natural hazards or with
important ecological function. Areas categorized as ECA in Seattle’s Code include those
prone to landslide, flood, liquefaction, seismic and volcanic activity, as well as wetlands and
wildlife conservation areas. In Seattle, landslide-prone areas compose 8.4 percent of the
city’s area (Seattle Office of Emergency Management, 2014).
Landslide-prone areas include ‘known landslide areas,’ which demonstrate past
movement either through documented record or geological evidence, ‘potential landslide
areas,’ which are those areas mapped by Shannon & Wilson (2000) in its ‘Seattle Landslide
Study,’ areas with past landslide activity, landslide runout zones, areas within a certain
distance of the top of a steep slope, and areas on a steep slope. Steep-slopes are defined as
areas with a vertical incline of ten feet or more over a horizontal area of 25 feet or less, or
forty percent incline.
In general, an applicant who wishes to develop in a landslide-prone ECA must apply
for a land use permit from the Department of Construction and Inspections (DCI). The
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application must include a topographic survey detailing the physical landscape of the site and
prepared by a licensed surveyor, a map detailing critical areas and buffers prepared by
“qualified professionals,” and technical reports that detail the geology, hydrology, and soils
on site, as well as engineering conditions that must be met to make a project feasible.
A permit, if granted, is conditioned approval of a land use project. However, a
building permit is also required to commence demolition or construction. The applicant must
meet all requirements from the both the general development standards and standards for
landslide-prone critical areas, at minimum, in order to receive a permit approval from the
Director of DCI (Director). Provided below is only a selection of the requirements from these
regulations:

General development standards (25.09.060)


Avoid negative impacts to ECAs



Fencing during construction



Minimize removal of vegetation



Review of construction schedule and mitigation plan



Grading generally complete before the wet season

Landslide-prone critical areas (25.09.080)


Stabilize all areas of a site disturbed by construction



Minimize environmental harm and ensure stability and safety



May be subject to third-party geotechnical review



Do not remove of trees or vegetation unless pruning or routine maintenance
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If applicable, the development standards for steep slope areas (25.09.180)


May not develop on steep slopes of over 40 percent incline unless
o The site is located where other development is already located
o The steep slope in question was created through previous, legal, grading
activity
o The slope is less than 20 feet in vertical rise and more than 30 feet from
another slope
o Development promotes stability of the slope
o A steep slope variance is granted; in which case only 30 percent may be
disturbed



Must buffer 15 feet between development and the toe and the top of the slope



Authorized vegetation removal must be kept to a minimum and must followed a plan
approved by DCI

If the proposed development also falls within a Shoreline District, it is subject to
additional development standards as described in 23.60A.156 Standards for Environmentally
Critical Areas in the Shoreline District. These shoreline regulations impose additional
requirements for development in Shoreline Districts due to concerns about their impact on
water quality and marine habitat.
Regulatory Relief. In some cases, an applicant may be eligible for regulatory relief,
indicating that the applicant does not have to meet some or all of the requirements described
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above. Applicants have four primary avenues for regulatory relief in areas considered
landslide-prone:


ECA exemptions,



small project waivers,



steep slope variances, and



ECA exceptions.

Applicants will typically pursue exemptions first if they believe they qualify for one. If
an applicant does not qualify for an exemption, the applicant may apply for a small project
waiver or a steep slope variance, depending on the characteristics of the project. ECA
exceptions, the last option, can be pursued only after the applicant demonstrates that the
project qualified for no other type of regulatory relief. Each form of relief is described in
more detail below.
An exemption is the broadest form of relief possible and, if granted, the project in
question is exempt from all provisions of the Code’s Regulations for ECAs, though it must
still follow all other applicable regulations in the general land use code. An applicant only
qualifies for exemption relief if the project meets one or more of the following criteria:
1) not within an ECA,
2) involves ending a public health or safety risk and requires immediate remediation,
3) alters an existing structure that does not negatively impact the ECA,
4) rebuilds a structure “destroyed by an act of nature” and construction does not further
impact the ECA,
5) only involves relocation of utilities infrastructure under certain conditions,
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6) is a public project,
7) is routine repair to public facilities,
8) is routine vegetation or tree maintenance.

If an exemption is granted, the project is no longer guided by the standards within the
ECA Regulations chapter, save for any conditions laid out by the Director. If an applicant
does not qualify for exemption, the applicant may seek other types of relief, depending on the
characteristics of the project proposal. There is no administrative appeal process for
exemptions.
If an applicant does not qualify for exemption, the applicant may seek a small project
waiver. DCI may grant an applicant a small project waiver within a landslide-prone area if
the proposal is to build a new accessory structure or addition to an existing structure that is:
1) limited to 300 square feet within a steep-slope area or 750 square feet within a
landslide-prone area,
2) the lot existed prior to October 31, 1992 when the city’s permanent ECA
regulations were adopted, and
3) it is not possible to develop outside of the ECA or buffer.

A waiver permits a project, by virtue of its small-scale, where it may otherwise be denied in a
regular review process. Small project waivers are exempt from application submittal
requirements (25.09.330), which require a detailed plan of how an applicant will comply with
general development standards. However, projects granted small project waivers are still
subject to all other ECA regulations.
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If developing on a steep-slope area, an applicant may apply for a steep slope variance,
which reduces the required 15-foot buffer from the top and toe of the slope. An applicant
may pursue this type of relief if the project does not qualify for, or does not need, the high
level of relief provided by exemptions. Variances provide relief from specific code
requirements. A steep slope variance reduces buffers to slope only to the minimum necessary
“to afford relief from hardship.” Steep slope variances are only granted if the lot in question
existed before the adoption of ECA regulations in 1992.
An ECA exception is the last course of action in seeking regulatory relief; DCI will
not consider granting an exception until “all other administrative remedies in the ECA
Regulations and Code Title 23 have been exhausted” (SDCI, 2015, p.1). ECA exceptions
allow applicants to use and improve the value of their land, despite ECA status. An exception
modifies regulations to allow “reasonable use of the property” with modification limited to
the “minimum necessary” to grant reasonable use. For example, if an applicant can
demonstrate that the standard setback precludes reasonable use of the property, an applicant
could request an exception to alter a setback to a distance less than the minimum stipulated in
the ECA regulations. If such an exception is granted, all other regulations within the chapter
still apply.
SEPA. The State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) requires DCI to consider
potential environmental impacts of development proposals before making decisions.
Depending on scale, location, and ECA status, a project may be considered categorically
exempt from SEPA review. Smaller projects, those in high-density areas, and those outside
of ECA areas are more likely to fall into the exempt category.
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Two types of activities within ECAs automatically require SEPA review due to their
high environmental impacts: grading activity within a landslide-prone area and short platting
within any ECA. Grading involves altering ground level by excavating, adding, or moving
soils, which in landslide-prone areas has the potential to destabilize the slope and thus
requires SEPA review. Short platting divides a property into multiple lots for multiple
structures. The higher intensity development suggested by a short platting project increases
the load on a slope and, thus, the potential the slope will fail. As such, short platting subjects
the project to SEPA review. In addition, any development proposal for a single-family
dwelling within a landslide-prone area is subject to SEPA review if the lot is over 9,000
square feet (836 square meters).
Applicants subject to SEPA review must submit an Environmental Checklist that
acknowledges potential adverse environmental impacts their project may have and what
mitigative measures the applicant will take. An applicant must erect a sign of public notice
indicating that the proposed project is under environmental review. Following the erection of
the sign, the proposal is subject to a public comment period of 14 days in which members of
the public as well as the applicant can submit letters to DCI to express their support for, or
concerns about, the proposed project. At the end of the comment period, DCI will make an
environmental threshold decision, a decision that determines whether further review is
required. If DCI determines that a project is likely to have substantial adverse environmental
impact, DCI will issue a Declaration of Significance. With such a declaration, the applicant
must submit an Environmental Impact Statement, which DCI uses to decide whether to
approve or deny a permit, as well as any conditions upon which an approval is granted.

51
Appeal Process. All decisions made by DCI are appealable to Seattle’s Hearing
Examiner, with the exception of Type I decisions, which include exemptions. Any party may
appeal a decision, including applicants, neighbors, and concerned citizens. Applicants may
appeal the denial of a permit or regulatory relief or the conditions placed upon their projects.
Neighbors or concerned citizens may appeal the granting of a permit, regulatory relief, or
conditions placed upon a project. The Hearing Examiner’s task is only to evaluate whether
the Director of DCI made a decision consistent with the Code, with the burden of proof that a
decision was inconsistent resting on the party appealing. For this reason, the Code directs the
Hearing Examiner to give “substantial weight” to the Director’s decision. If an appellant
loses his or her case at the Hearing Examiner level, the appellant still has recourse to appeal
to the Superior Court of Washington and then up through the appeals courts to the State
Supreme Court.
Actors
The main actors in a permitting appeal process are the applicant, the appellant, and the
mediating government agency. However, outside experts may also play a role in the dispute
process. Below are brief definitions of the roles and responsibilities of actors, as well as their
relationships with other actors.
Applicant. An applicant is a property owner or developer who is applying for a
permit to build upon his or her property. When a property is in an ECA area, the applicant
must hire a geotechnical engineer, and potentially other types of technical experts, to assess
the feasibility of development on a parcel. The applicant then submits a geotechnical report
with a land use application to DCI. If a land use application is approved, the applicant may
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move to obtain a building permit. If an application is denied, the applicant may reapply with
an altered proposal or appeal DCI’s decision to the Hearing Examiner.
Department of Construction and Inspections (DCI). DCI is a city agency that
regulates land use and construction practices; it is responsible for enforcing Seattle’s ECA
regulations. DCI reviews land use and building applications and issues permits based on
whether a proposal is consistent with municipal code. Most land use decisions made by DCI
are appealable to the Hearing Examiner. DCI was formally known as the Department of
Planning and Development (DPD) and as the Department of Construction and Land Use
(DCLU). For clarity’s sake, the agency is referred to only as DCI throughout this thesis.
Hearing Examiner. The Hearing Examiner is responsible for reviewing decisions of
city agencies when they are challenged as inconsistent with applicable regulations. When
applicants or appellants challenge decisions made by DCI, they are heard by the Hearing
Examiner, who determines whether DCI’s decision was consistent with code. The Hearing
Examiner is the final administrative authority on decisions. Appellants must file a lawsuit for
further appeal.
Appellant. An appellant is an individual or group that formally challenges a decision
made by DCI, whether that decision is the approval of, denial of, or conditions attached to,
development. An appellant may be the applicant or a third party opposed to DCI’s decision.
Geotechnical engineer. A geotechnical engineer assesses the feasibility of
development on a site through evaluation of ground characteristics. Applicants hire
geotechnical consultants, often through consulting firms, to produce reports for a land use
application. The geotechnical engineer produces a report that details strength parameters of
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ground material and makes recommendations for how development can safety occur based
on the site’s limitations, but stops short of making structural recommendations.

Conclusion
Seattle’s history of landslide disaster prompted the City in the 1980s and 1990s to
adopt more stringent development rule for hazardous areas. Property owners or developers
who wish to develop in landslide-prone areas must now follow several sets of standards laid
out in Chapter 25.09 of the Seattle Municipal Code. A proposal must meet all applicable
ECA standards for the DCI to approve the application, or it may be subject to conditions, or
denied. If an applicant or third party opposes DCI’s decision, they may appeal to the Hearing
Examiner. These appeals are a major focus of my methodology.
In the next chapter, I explain the methodology I used to sample and analyze
contentious land use regulation of steep slopes in Seattle. Most of the disputes that I analyze
take place at the Hearing Examiner level. However, some disputes went through the Hearing
Examiner and then on to various levels of appeals in the court systems, and one originates in
the court system.
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Chapter 5 – Methodology
To better understand the role of geological information in supporting risk-adverse
land-use planning in development in Seattle, this thesis aims to identify a) what common
arguments about landslide risk and regulation are used by actors in regulatory disputes in
Seattle and b) how these actors use science and technical information to support their
arguments. For the purpose of this thesis, disputes are defined broadly as legal challenges
that revolve around landslide-related regulations, policy-decisions, or hazard outcomes, and
is concerned with the time period from 1990-2015.
To identify how actors use science and technical information to support their
arguments, I analyzed arguments in twelve temporally and geographically diverse disputes
by manually organizing selected disputes by their outcomes, actors, and arguments. I noted
which actors most commonly used scientific and technical information, and how that
information supported their interests, and which actors relied on non-scientific information or
lacked evidence in their arguments. To illicit broader actor arguments and interests about
landslide risk regulation, I analyzed dispute material, news articles documenting landslide
regulation debates, and interviews with scientists and planners with experience in landslide
hazard risk. I describe my selection of disputes and analysis methodology below. In the later
part of the chapter, I provide narrative summaries of the 12 disputes selected.

Identifying and Sampling Disputes
I collected and cataloged disputes relating to Seattle’s ECA regulations between 1990
and 2015 through a search of court records, GMA hearing board records, newspaper
archives, neighborhood blogs, hearing examiner records and basic google searches.
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Keywords “steep slope” and “landslide” were used in combination with the words “appeal,”
“regulations,” “lawsuit,” and “Seattle” depending on the search engine. These searches
produced close to 200 disputes, which were manually filtered to ensure relevance to the
thesis topic. I eliminated 110 disputes that either did not fit my temporal or geographic
criteria, were duplicates, or were not focused on landslide regulation. From the remaining 90
disputes, I selected only those disputes in which landslide-related regulations were a
significant part of contention, and only those in which action was taken by a party to change
an interpretation of these regulations or the regulations themselves. I opted out of selecting
regulation-related disagreements that amounted only to online banter common to
neighborhood blogs, not because these disputes are not valuable to understanding the politics
of hazard regulation, but because these disputes lacked the depth needed for analysis. These
more informal and social-media based disputes were cataloged and used as content for
narrative analysis in a separate dimension of the project, as described in the section Actor
Narratives and Fundamental Perspectives on Landslide Hazards below.
After manual filtering, there remained 90 disputes, 81 of which were Hearing
Examiner case files. Eight were court cases including Superior, Appeal, and Supreme cases.
One was a Growth Management Hearing Board Case against the City of Seattle. From this
list of 90 disputes, 40 were randomly selected by assigning each dispute a number and
generating a random set of numbers. For each of the 40 disputes selected, I created a file that
included a dispute summary, noted the date, address and neighborhood, appellant information
and resolution. I logged dispute files in a single spreadsheet where they could be organized
and compared easily. My goal was to find a means of sorting these disputes into categories
by which I could systematically select a subset of 12 disputes for my final sample.
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I decided to divide cases into clear-cut categories of appellant type, time period, and
geographic location. I had originally planned to categorize my disputes by primary grounds
for launching dispute, but found that in a majority of cases appellants and plaintiffs use
multiple and diverse arguments to maximize their odds of prevailing in the case. For
instance, neighbors appealing a development project based on its impacts on traffic and
parking may find it useful to cite issues with the land’s geological stability, the adequacy of
its mitigation measures against slope failures, or even the proposed building’s aesthetic
design. The tendency for cases to hold mixed arguments on both sides complicates
identifying a singular grievance by which cases could be categorized, though categorizing by
appellant type, period, and location proved a viable categorization scheme.
I found three distinct categories for appellant type: neighbors challenging
greenlighted projects or specific conditions by which a project had been approved
(‘neighbor’); applicants challenging a project denial or project condition (‘applicant’); and
residents or citizens challenging regulations or regulation enforcement alleged to have
resulted in adverse events post-development, typically with claims of negligence (‘plaintiff’).
From the 40 cases cataloged, 25 were ‘neighbor’ appellant type, 13 were ‘applicant,’
and two were ‘plaintiff.’ I used proportional sampling of my appellant types to select my
final case sample. Because my goal was to have twelve cases for in-depth analysis, I aimed to
have seven ‘neighbor’ cases, four ‘applicant’ cases and one ‘plaintiff’ case. To select these
cases in a way that produced temporal and geographic diversity, I divided my time range into
three roughly equal intervals: 1990-1997, 1998-2006, and 2007-2015. I then allocated a
roughly equal number of cases within each appellant type to each time period. For example,
of the seven ‘neighbor’ cases, three were selected from 1990-1997, two from 1998-2006 and
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two from 2007-2015. The time period 1990-1997 was allotted the higher number of cases
where the total did not divide evenly by three because the greatest number of cases lay in that
range. With the predetermined selection criteria in mind, shown as the italic numbers in
Table 1 below, I went through my 40 case spreadsheet to do the final selection.

Table 1. Ideal and actual dispute selection by year and appellant type
Citizen

Applicant

Plaintiff

Ideal (Actual)

Ideal (Actual)

Ideal (Actual)

1990-1997

3 (3)

2 (2)

1998-2006

2 (2)

1 (2)

2007-2015

2 (2)

1 (0)

Total

7

4

Time period

1 (1)

1

The selection of actual cases, shown in parentheses in Table 1 above, deviated
slightly from my ideal selection. There was no case that fulfilled the ‘applicant’ appellant
type within the time range 2007-2015, so I selected one from the closest year in the 19982006 category. Where multiple cases fulfilled my criteria and I could make a choice, I chose
based on geographic diversity, noting the neighborhood associated with the case. I ensured I
had good representation of the West Seattle and Magnolia neighborhoods, where a majority
of disputes come from, but also that I had representation from Lake City, South Lake Union,
and Leschi. Out of the two options I had to select for my ‘plaintiff’ category, I chose the one
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that I knew had better documentation. For each dispute, I gathered all available news articles
and legal files, creating case files for each.

Gathering Data
For disputes that took place at the Hearing Examiner level, I accessed the Hearing
Examiner file on the city website. For disputes that reached Superior Court, I accessed court
records at the City Clerk’s office in downtown Seattle and printed select documents. One
dispute was a State Supreme Court case, which, upon arrival at the courthouse in Olympia, I
discovered had been destroyed. However, that dispute had been so highly publicized in the
late-1990s that I decided to move forth with it, relying solely on news articles and limited
court records from third party online legal databases.
For all disputes, I searched for additional data through name searches on the Google
search engine and within Seattle Times and Seattle Post-Intelligencer archives.

Analyzing Science and Technical Arguments
To identify how science and technical information are used in landslide hazard
disputes, I studied the arguments and information used in the sample cases. I wrote case
summaries for each dispute, highlighting where technical information-based arguments were
made. I then created a spreadsheet that noted the case’s actors, the actors’ preferred outcomes
or desires, the main arguments put forth, and what type of evidence supported those
arguments. Also noted for each case was which actor prevailed in the dispute. Prevailing
actors were compared against the types of arguments those actors tended to make, and what
kind of information those actors tended to use.
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Interviews
In addition to collecting and analyzing dispute files, I conducted semi-structured
interviews with six planners and seven science or technical experts through personal referral
and through participant referral. Science and technical experts were composed of one
geotechnical consultant and six university or government geologists. Planners worked in the
areas of hazard mitigation, disaster response, permitting, or policymaking and were from
various regional jurisdictions.
I asked planners a different set of questions than scientists and technical experts, but
both groups discussed the general themes of science-policy communication, their role in
science-policy communication, and obstacles to better landslide hazard regulation. Interviews
were semi-structured, and involved a limited number of set questions, but I encouraged
participant elaboration and extended discussion. I transcribed all interviews and used the
transcriptions as sources for qualitative analysis and as quotes within the body of this thesis.
Because my project involved interviews, I completed a human subjects review and developed
an informed consent form that was provided to informants before their participation in my
project. Informants were made aware that their identities would be left anonymous. A list of
predetermined questions and a copy of the informed consent form are located in the
appendix.

Using NVivo for Organization and Analysis
To identify the origins of actor narratives and arguments, I analyzed dispute
documents, news articles, and interviews with scientists and planners using narrative analysis
in NVivo. NVivo 11 is a standard qualitative data analysis software that organizes, codes,
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and visualizes patterns in data. It stores and analyzes data across ‘cases’— in this thesis
dispute cases — and ‘nodes,’ which are used to identify themes. The user can code sections
of text by different nodes and later compare the prevalence of nodes, relationships between
text sources and nodes, or relationships between types of cases and nodes. NVivo served
primarily as an organizational tool and as a coding tool for this project.
I used NVivo 11 to store 130 news articles, over a dozen legal documents, and nine
interview transcripts. Within NVivo, I then coded all text iteratively over the course of six
months as new sources were added to the database. I coded sections of text at a node that
reflected a specific argument, concern, or desire of an actor, or for broad concepts. For
example, I coded ‘negligence’ because it is an argument, ‘parking’ because it is an actor
concern, ‘views’ because it is an actor desire, and ‘acceptable risk’ because it is a broad
concept that relates to multiple actors and their arguments, concerns, and desires. I coded
iteratively, deleted nodes, renamed them, or merged them with other nodes as found to be fit
to the data. Figure 3 is a screenshot depicting a partial list of nodes in order of reference
frequency. After all text had been coded, I discussed the nodes that had the most text
references as they relate to actor narratives in disputes. The purpose of narrative analysis was
to identify worldviews, perceptions, or stories of individuals or groups through data and
artifact analysis.
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Figure 3 A screenshot of NVivo depicts 'nodes,' or themes, in the order of reference
frequency.
In the next chapter, I summarize the 12 selected disputes, providing details about the
basis for dispute, actors involved, types of arguments used, and resolution. The following
chapters then detail my analysis of these disputes and the news articles and interviews I
gathered as part of this thesis work.
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Chapter 6 – Dispute Summaries
This chapter summarizes the 12 disputes I selected to analyze the use of science and
technical information in the regulation of development on landslide-prone slopes. The
disputes are summarized below and organized chronologically. Dispute summaries note the
character of the development disputed, applicable regulations, and demonstrate how actor
interests conflict. Though all disputes below are public information, I do not find it useful to
publish the names of the individuals involved, and thus actors are referred to as ‘appellant,’
‘applicant,’ or ‘plaintiff.’ Cases are identified by a number assigned by me, and by the street
and neighborhood of the disputed development. All neighborhoods described are labeled in
Figure 1, the map provide in Chapter 3 showing Seattle’s landslide areas.
Dispute 1 – 1990-1995 – Aurora Ave N, Queen Anne
In 1990, a developer purchased a property on a steep slope on Aurora Avenue from
the Seattle for $141,000 on the same day that the interim ECA regulations were signed into
law. The developer was unaware of the interim regulations at the time of purchase. In 1992,
the developer (applicant) applied for a steep slope exception to develop more than 40 percent
of the property because he could not ‘reasonably’ use his property conforming to that limit.
To qualify for an exception, an applicant must demonstrate that application of a rule
is unreasonable, and that the proposal will not cause any significant adverse environmental
impacts. It had been established that the slope in question was steep, but stable. The applicant
produced expert testimony that erosion currently occurred on the slope at a rate of 2 cubic
feet (.05 cubic meters) annually. With complete development of the slope, erosion would be
reduced to zero.
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The question at hand was whether application of the 40 percent rule was
unreasonable in the applicant’s case. If the standard was found to be unreasonable, the
applicant would entitled only to the minimum relief necessary to achieve ‘reasonable use.’
The applicant submitted with his application for exception four development plans,
three of which conformed to the 40 percent rule, the last of which did not. The last plan was
preferred, and proposed to disturb 97 percent of the steep slope. The applicant intended to
demonstrate that the three plans that conformed to the 40 percent limit were not economically
viable because they produced fewer square feet of leasable space. DCI found that one of
these three conforming plans was viable, and denied the exception. The applicant appealed
DCI’s denial of the exception to the Hearing Examiner.
The Hearing Examiner was tasked with the question of whether application of the 40
percent rule was unreasonable for the applicant’s proposal, and whether DCI had erred in its
judgment.
The applicant argued that more coverage of the steep slope would prevent erosion and
landslide risk more so than a 40 percent development coverage would. Thus, his preferred
alternative was aligned with the purpose of the ECA regulations. The applicant produced
testimony from four highly regarded geotechnical engineers, all of whom concluded that the
preferred project would reduce the current level of erosion on the slope and that application
of the 40 percent rule would inhibit erosion control. Three of the four geotechnical engineers
at the hearing were unpaid, and explicitly noted that they agreed to provide testimony
because they felt that the relevant portion of the ECA regulations were poorly designed, and
in many cases resulted in higher risk of erosion and slope instability. One stated, “[m]y
previous review of this case and other related cases has convinced me that the City’s
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regulation is unreasonable and inconsistent with its stated goal” (Pang vs. Hearing Examiner
for the City of Seattle and City of Seattle, 1994). Another stated that he was concerned that
parts of the ECA regulations are "unsupportable on a scientific basis and not credible to
achieve the objectives that were stipulated in the Critical Areas Ordinance” (Pang vs.
Hearing Examiner for the City of Seattle and City of Seattle, 1994).
The Hearing Examiner noted that though the application of the 40 percent rule was
unreasonable in this case, the applicant’s preferred plan did not demonstrate minimum relief
necessary, and that the applicant had not explored any intermediate options that disturbed
more than the 40 percent limit but less than the 90 percent proposed. The Hearing Examiner
agreed with the applicant that additional coverage would prevent more erosion, but that the
ECA regulations stipulated that erosion control be addressed in a less intrusive way. The
Hearing Examiner also noted that the lack of economic viability of the plans, as testified by
the real estate brokers, demonstrated a dip in the real estate market and was not evidence of
misapplication of ECA regulations. The Hearing Examiner confirmed DCI’s decision to deny
the exception.
The applicant appealed this decision to the Superior Court. The applicant again
argued that denying an exception to develop his preferred proposal was unreasonable because
compliance with regulations would result in projects not economically viable. By denying the
ability to develop and profit from his land, he argued, the City was guilty of a taking. The
applicant claimed that through application of the regulations, the City forced him to bear the
public burden of preserving greenspace. The applicant reiterated the argument that his
preferred proposal would be more effective at preventing erosion than a plan that conformed
to the 40 percent rule. The applicant requested reversal of the decisions to deny regulatory
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relief, and compensation for the “violation of their federal rights,” government taking, and
legal fees. The Court found that:
Under these circumstances, there is no legitimate regulatory purpose for the City to
enforce the steep slopes building restrictions against the applicants. Accordingly, the
City’s enforcement of the restrictions against the applicants was an improper exercise
of governmental authority since enforcement failed to be rationally related to
advancing the purposes for which the restrictions were passed (Pang vs. Hearing
Examiner for the City of Seattle and City of Seattle, 1994).

The Court directed the City to allow the exception for the applicant’s preferred
project. The City paid the applicants a settlement amount of over $60,000.

Dispute 2 – 1991 – West Plymouth St., Magnolia
An application to develop a three-story single family home in a steep slope ECA and
designated greenbelt area was received by DCI. The proposal was subject to L2 zoning,
which requires 30 percent of the lot to be preserved as open space. The applicant applied for
height and open space variances, which would allow her to exceed the zone limits of 25 feet
for height and to fulfill part of the open space requirement through the construction of a
rooftop deck. The applicant submitted an environmental checklist as required by SEPA, as
well as a soils report, which recommended construction techniques to best mitigate for
erosion and landslide risk. DCI reviewed these recommendations and agreed that they would
be sufficient to mitigate landslide risk. The DCI Director subsequently issued the project a
Determination of Nonsignificance (DNS).
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Several neighbors appealed the DNS, stating they were primarily concerned about the
impact that the development may have on wildlife and on slope stability. Appellants used
testimony from a neighbor that cracks in the concrete on his property indicated slope
movement. No expert testimony was provided to substantiate the claim that the slope was
unstable, to contradict the soils report submitted by the applicant’s geotechnical engineer, or
to demonstrate adverse impact to wildlife.
One of the appellants and her husband owned an apartment complex across the street
from which views of Elliot Bay would be blocked with the proposed development. The
appellants suggested, based on the advice of a real estate broker, that the value of their
apartment complex would be reduced by $165,000 if those views were lost. For this reason,
appellants argued that the height variance requested by the applicant should be denied. Other
appellants had similar concerns about the development blocking views of Elliot Bay from the
vantage point of the street.
Because the appellants had no produced expert testimony to demonstrate slope instability, the
Hearing Examiner dismissed this claim. The Hearing Examiner noted that regardless of
whether a variance was issued for the proposal, views would be diminished by any
development on the subject parcel. Because no established public views were at risk, the
granting of the variance would not contradict SEPA policies. The Hearing Examiner affirmed
the DCI decision to issue a DNS for the proposal.

Dispute 3 – 1993 – Lakeside Ave., Leschi
DCI denied an ECA exception to an applicant proposing to build a three-story singlefamily home on a steep slope in the Leschi neighborhood. The site on which the applicant
proposed to build was almost entirely steep slope with an average incline of 70 percent. ECA
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regulations stipulate that not more than 40 percent of a steep slope area can be covered by
impervious surfaces, and the applicant’s proposal was to develop almost 54 of the slope. To
bypass the 40 percent rule, the applicant applied for an ECA exception. ECA exceptions
modify ECA regulations on a case basis to allow for ‘reasonable use’ of a property. The
applicant’s argument was that, if the 40 percent rule were applied to him, the City would be
denying him reasonable use.
Applications for ECA exceptions must be accompanied by an alternative proposal
that conforms to the requirement from which the applicant is requesting relief. The
alternative proposal theoretically demonstrates the hardship an applicant would endure by
following standard regulations. The applicant’s alternative proposal reduced overall
impervious surface to 39 percent by reducing the sizes of walkways, decks, and landings, and
removing plans for two patios. The original plans for the structure itself were otherwise
identical to the none-conforming proposal. The Director of DCI denied him the ECA
exception on the basis that his alternative proposal, which conformed to ECA regulations,
qualified as reasonable use that did not present the applicant hardship. The applicant
subsequently appealed to the Hearing Examiner.
The applicant argued that he had expected to be able to develop his property to the
extent of his original proposal because other homes, which had been built prior to the passage
of ECA regulations, were of similar size and had the additional components of patios,
driveways and other impermeable areas on site. Denying him the right to develop further
than the allowed 40 percent would be unreasonable, the applicant argued, because his
property would not par up to neighboring properties in terms of proportion of developed area.
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The applicant hired several geotechnical experts who argued that developing a greater
proportion of the property with the proposed decks, patios, and other impermeable structures,
would better mitigate landslide and erosion risks. The geotechnical experts testified that
slopes that are exposed to precipitation and runoff have a greater risk of failure and that the
best way to mitigate for landslide and erosion susceptibility is to cover the slope with
impermeable surfaces. The geotechnical experts were in favor of the applicant original
proposal, which covered 54 percent of the slope.
As the Hearing Examiner noted, the views of the applicant and his geotechnical
experts regarding slope coverage directly contradicted the view represented in ECA
regulations, which was that less development in ECA areas was better for controlling erosion
and mitigating landslide risk.
The Hearing Examiner concluded that, because the applicant had demonstrated in his
alternative proposal that an identical structure that conformed to regulations was possible,
adherence to the 40 percent rule did not represent unreasonable use. The Hearing Examiner
rejected the applicant second argument that increasing the proportion of impermeable surface
better controlled erosion and mitigated landslide risk on the basis that the argument
challenged the regulation itself, a dispute outside of the Hearing Examiner’s purview. The
Hearing Examiner confirmed the Director’s decision that the exception should be denied.

Dispute 4 – 1994 – 54th Place SW., West Seattle
DCI issued a SEPA Determination of Nonsignificance (DNS) for a proposal to
demolish a single-family home and construct 15 units with underground parking on a steep
slope ECA in the coastal Alki neighborhood of West Seattle (Figure 1). The area of proposed
development was highly vegetated and close to the Duwamish Head Greenbelt. The proposal
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would disturb 9 percent of the steep slope, substantially under the 30 percent limit, and the
applicant’s geotechnical engineer submitted to DCI a minimal risk statement. DCI issued a
DNS, indicating its belief that the proposal posed no threat to the environment, but with the
condition that the applicant plant 15 trees on the slope. A SEPA determination does not
constitute a permit decision, but may affect a future permit decision.
Several citizens appealed the issuance of the DNS. They argued that the development
of the proposed structure would pose a threat to wildlife and vegetation on and adjacent to
the property, to the stability of the slope, and to drainage. They requested that a prior
landslide in the area be investigated. Appellants were also concerned with the negative
impact the new development would have on the aesthetics of the landscape, parking, traffic,
noise, and light.
The appellants’ aesthetic concerns about the development were dismissed because
SEPA policies concern only public views, which were not at risk. The Hearing Examine also
dismissed concerns about light pollution because the appellants had provided no evidence to
substantiate this claim.
The Hearing Examiner, citing the City’s SEPA policy, clarified that because the site
was not mapped as ‘priority habitat’ by the Department of Fish and Wildlife, it could not be
considered the rare or unique habitat that would merit protection under SEPA. The Hearing
Examiner argued that the conditioned planting of 15 trees on site would sufficiently mitigate
any detriment to the environment posed by the new development.
In response to the appellants’ concerns about soils and slope stability, the Hearing
Examiner pointed out that the project was subject to several ECA regulations that would
require site-specific construction techniques and mitigation for landslide hazard.
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In regards to parking and traffic, the Hearing Examiner decided that the underground
parking proposed by the applicant would mitigate for any increase in vehicles, and that traffic
on the street of proposed development would not be substantially disrupted to the extent that
mitigation is required. The Hearing Examiner affirmed the Director’s decision to issue a
DNS.

Dispute 5 – 1997 – 49th Ave SW., West Seattle
DCI approved an application to subdivide a single parcel with a home built upon it
into two parcels. Presumably, the new parcel would be subject to future development of a
single-family home as zoning allowed. The West Seattle (Figure 1) property lay about 200
feet from the coastline with the westernmost part of the property sloping steeply downward
into a forested area toward the coast. The City had mapped the property, and surrounding
area, as “Potential Slide Areas” in previous reports because of an ancient landslide
underlying the area. DCI approved the application and issued a Determination of NonSignificance, indicating its view that no negative environmental impact would occur from the
proposal, despite the hazard presence, because the application was for subplatting only and
no development was involved. Any future proposal for construction upon the property would
be met with a more thorough review of the hazards present in the area.
The approval of the subplatting application was quickly appealed to the Hearing
Examiner by a neighbor of the property on several grounds. Her main grievance was that a
stability analysis should have been completed before approving the sub plat of the property.
As a homeowner adjacent to the subject site, she worried that any future development on the
subject site, which she believed was landslide-prone, could destabilize her own property.
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Prior to the DCI decision, several geotechnical studies had been done on or near to
the subject property. In 1970, the City did a soil boring approximately 75 feet away from the
property and found a clay layer 35 feet deep. Clay overlaid by sand is common to Puget
Sound coastal stratigraphy; it is also indicative of potential landslide risk. The 1970 record
was utilized by the appellant as evidence of widespread landslide-prone stratigraphy in the
immediate area, including on the subject property. A soil boring had been performed by the
applicant’s engineer earlier in the summer of 1997, but had only reached a depth of 10 feet. If
the clay-sand combination did indeed underlay the subject property, the applicant’s boring
had not reached a sufficient depth to identify it. The appellant’s geotechnical engineer
indicated that, given the prevalence of clay in the area’s costal stratigraphy, without doing a
boring that extended to at least the toe of the slope, it could not be assumed that there was no
clay layer. Another boring was not apparently done. However, a second geotechnical
assessment was arranged, which included geotechnical engineers hired by both the applicant
and the appellant, and a representative from DCI. The report, as summarized by the Hearing
Examiner, concluded, “absent a major earthquake, it is unlikely that the ancient landslide
would undergo significant movement in the foreseeable future.”
The appellant submitted two more points of appeal on top of her principal argument
that the subject property was unstable and landslide-prone. She argued that the drainage from
the property would overflow its designated public storm drain, which was dismissed by the
civil engineer who did a drainage review for the City. The appellant further argued that the
future structure to be built upon the subject property would be incompatible with the existing
neighborhood because its maximum buildable lot was smaller than that of other properties in
the neighborhood. No evidence was provided for this claim.
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The Hearing Examiner ultimately confirmed the Director’s decision to approve the
sub plat application, for the primary reason that dividing the property for future development
should not be subject to the same standards as development. However, the Hearing Examiner
conditioned that prior to the submission of any construction plans, a boring must be done by
a geotechnical engineer to a depth of 36 feet, one foot deeper than was done in the 1970
boring that identified clay. The results of the boring would be used by the engineer
responsible for submitting an evaluation to DCI that ensures minimal harm to adjacent
properties.

Dispute 6 – 1997-2003 – Lakeside Blvd., Eastlake
In 1989, before ECA regulations had been passed in Seattle, the City granted a permit
to build three townhomes upon a landslide-prone area of Eastlake (Figure 1) after reviewing
a geotechnical report of the slope, which indicated a risk of slope movement. The City
conditioned the permit upon three conditions; buyers would have to be notified of the
potential for soil movement, landslide insurance was required, and developers were to sign a
covenant releasing the City of all liability or damages caused by slope movement, unless the
damage had been caused by City negligence. That covenant applied to all successive owners
of the property.
The developers built and sold all three townhomes for around $300,000 each,
assuring all buyers that the structures were stable and engineered in a way to withstand soil
movement. In early January of 1997, after heavy regional precipitation, all three properties
began sliding. They were condemned by the City.
The homeowners sued nearly every actor involved with the development of the
townhomes, including the developers, the builders, the architects, and engineers. Though the

73
homeowners received a settlement of $190,000 from the developers, claims against the other
actors were dismissed due to a statute of limitations of six years. The homeowners
subsequently sued the City for $1 million, maintaining that the City had negligently granted a
building permit and failed to maintain public drainage systems near the subject properties.
Residents presented evidence at court demonstrating that the drainage system onsite had
funneled water toward the foundation of the properties rather than offsite, and that the City
had failed to inspect this system before it was buried after construction.
The City moved for summary judgement in Superior Court based on its no liability,
and the Court sided with the City. The homeowners appealed this decision to the Court of
Appeals, which found that the City, in neglecting to maintain the storm drains that
contributed to soil instability on the properties, could be found liable for damages.
The City, fearing a precedent that would leave it vulnerable to future liability suits,
appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, which found that, while the City could not be
held liable for permitting the construction of the townhomes, it could be found liable for
damages resultant of negligence of public drainage systems. In 2003, the City settled with the
homeowners for a total of $125,000.

Dispute 7 – 1998 – 124th St., Pinehurst
The Director of DCI approved a short plat application to subdivide a property in the
Pinehurst neighborhood of North Seattle (Figure 1) into three parcels. The property was
designated a steep slope and landslide prone area. An existing structure on one of the new
parcels would remain, and new properties would presumably be built on the other two
parcels. The short plat application was issued a DNS with conditions. The applicant also
applied for, and was granted, a limited ECA exemption after it was found that on the steep
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slopes the vertical incline was less than 20 feet, a condition upon which ECA regulations
allow development. As part of the application for the ECA exemption, the applicant hired a
consultant to do a soils report and a topographic survey. The applicant later submitted a
geotechnical report by a separate consulting firm as part of the Director’s requirement for the
exemption. That geotechnical report showed groundwater seepage under the site, but the
consultant concluded that the site could be developed with regard for their construction
recommendations.
The DCI received 17 comment letters opposing the short plat proposal during the
comment period prior to its decision. Those letters expressed concern for the negative impact
the short platting and subsequent development would have on density, traffic, parking,
drainage, the stability of the slope, and potential for landslides. Neighbors appealed both the
DNS and the approval of the short plat application. Appellants pointed to the geotechnical
report used by the applicant in support for the development to demonstrate drainage
problems on site. Appellants also noted that a church downhill from the site regularly
experienced basement flooding because of improper uphill drainage.
Appellants were concerned with the impact any new development would have on
street parking. However, they presented no evidence that additional vehicles in the vicinity
during construction would present a significant adverse impact to the neighborhood.
Appellants also complained that future development on the new parcels would be too
small to be compatible with other homes in the neighborhood, but presented no evidence that
future construction would necessarily be out of character with other homes in the
neighborhood.
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Concerning the appellants’ drainage concerns, the Hearing Examiner noted that
appellants had failed to provide evidence suggesting the DNS had been erroneously issued.
The appellants had no evidence to contradict the conclusion of the applicant’s geotechnical
consultant that development on the new parcels was feasible. The Hearing Examiner
dismissed concerns about parking and neighborhood compatibility because the appellants had
presented no evidence to support their arguments. The Hearing Examiner affirmed the
Director’s decision to approve the short plat application and DNS.

Dispute 8 – 2000 – 31st Ave W., Magnolia
The Director of DCI approved applications for two short plats and issued a DNS for
the construction of two two-unit townhomes and one single-family house in a steep slope
area in Magnolia (Figure 1). The applicant was also granted a limited steep slope exemption.
The applicant’s proposal was to build the townhomes and the single-family house on the east
side of the property, which faced an alleyway. The west side of the subject property was
already developed with three duplexes. The short plats would divide the property in a way so
that the house, and each townhome and duplex unit, sat on its own parcel. The new
construction would require grading and removal of 10 trees on the property. The applicant’s
geotechnical engineer concluded that the applicant’s proposal could be done with “minimum
risk.”
The applicant applied for, and was granted, a limited steep slope exemption because
the subject site has previously been developed, which is a condition on which an exemption
will be granted. This meant that the proposal was not subject to steep slope development
standards, but still subject to all other ECA standards. DCI conditioned its DNS on the
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applicant adhering to a construction plan that did not disrupt local access to the alley and that
did not generate noise outside of certain hours of the day.
The applicant also hired an expert to conduct a parking study, which concluded that
with the additional parking spaces provided on site of the new dwellings, there would be an
overflow of at most five vehicles. The parking study suggested the street could handle this
level of overflow.
Several neighbors appealed the issuance of the DNS and the approval of the short
plat. Their primary concerns pertained to slope stability, drainage, tree retention, parking,
structure height and scale, noise, and crowding of the alley. The appellants argued that these
issues had not been sufficiently addressed in the DCI’s decision to approve the short plat and
grant the development a DNS. Particular emphasis was put on parking shortages that would
arise from residents of the new structures. Appellants did not support their concerns with
technical studies or evidence that any regulations were being violated. The Hearing Examiner
noted that the appellants were “straightforward in its desire to block the entire project,”
fearing that it would set a precedence to develop dense housing throughout the neighborhood.
In regards to appellant concerns about drainage and slope stability, the Hearing
Examiner noted that the project had been granted a statement of “minimal risk” by the
applicant’s geotechnical engineer. Appellants did not provided evidence to contradict the
findings of that geotechnical engineer. Appellants similarly failed to produce evidence that
would contradict the findings of the parking study, which suggested minimal parking space
loss in the area.
Despite appellant claims about height and scale, the sizes of the proposed structures
were well within the limits defined by the zoning. The Hearing Examiner noted that DCI had
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conditioned its approval of the project upon design of a construction plan that would
maintain local access to the alley, and that this condition should alleviate appellant concerns
about crowding of the alley.
The Hearing Examiner affirmed the Director’s decision to approve the short plats and
to grant a DNS for the proposed development.

Dispute 9 – 2002 – 5th Ave N., Westlake
The Director of DCI denied a variance to a homeowner to allow an existing deck to
extend into his property’s side yards. The subject property was located on a steep slope and
designated a landslide area. After a landslide in 1996, the homeowner had fortified two
damaged retaining walls below his property and built the deck as a way to add weight to
those walls. He constructed the deck without a building permit or required variance to extend
the deck into his side yards. That deck was reported as a violation of code to DCI, and the
homeowner had subsequently applied for both the permit and variance. The homeowner
hired the consulting firm Shannon & Wilson to perform a geotechnical analysis of the deck
and property. Shannon & Wilson reported that while the deck was stable in normal
conditions, it was unstable under earthquake loading. It noted that the deck diverts water
away from the slope, yet DCI later suggested that diversion of surface water from the deck to
further down the slope increased landslide risk offsite. The Shannon & Wilson report
recommended remedial action to fortify the deck to withstand seismic stress, which was not
performed prior to application for the variance. It did not make any recommendations
regarding the deck’s extension into the side yards.
After reviewing the variance application, the Director of DCI denied the homeowner
the variance, based on the belief that the extension of the deck into the side yards was not
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necessary to ensure slope and deck stability, and therefore a variance was not warranted. The
denial of the variance indicated that the homeowner would have to remove the deck in its
current form.
The homeowner appealed this decision to the Hearing Examiner, arguing that the
extent of the current deck is necessary to prevent water from infiltrating the slope. While the
Shannon & Wilson report recommended that surface runoff be diverted away from the slope,
it did not recommend the extension of the deck’s surface area to accomplish this. The
Hearing Examiner reiterated DCI’s concern that the deck’s diversion of water downslope
from the property increased landslide risk on adjacent property. The Hearing Examiner
affirmed the Director’s decision and denied the variance, indicating that the homeowner
would have to consult with DCI to determine how to conform to code. Aerial imagery from
2016 shows that the deck has since been completely removed.

Dispute 10 – 2006 – Perkins Lane W., Magnolia
DCI denied a request for an ECA exemption to build a single-family home in a steep
slope area on Perkins Lane West in Magnolia (Figure 1). The property on which
development of the house was proposed was almost entirely steep slope. A house formerly
located on the same property had been destroyed by a landslide in 1955. The applicant sought
an exemption based on the subject slope being created by “legal grading activities,” those
“activities” being the creation of Perkins Lane. The exemption was denied because the steep
slope had existed prior to the creation of Perkins Lane, and the creation of the road
constituted minimal changes to the character of the steep slope. The applicants did not appeal
this decision. The applicant instead applied for an ECA exception. DCI requested additional
information from the applicants about wetlands on the property before making a decision.
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The applicant did not respond to the request for additional information, and instead submitted
a second application for exemption. The second exemption was based upon the claim that
application of ECA regulations, in this case prohibition of building on the property, would
“prevent necessary stabilization of a landslide-prone area.” This claim was supported by the
applicant’s geotechnical engineers, who had prepared a plan to increase the stability of the
subject property and surrounding area by constructing retaining walls and drainage systems.
DCI denied the applicant’s second exemption request, disagreeing that application of
regulations prevented stabilization of the undeveloped slope, and indicating that an ECA
exception was necessary for the project. The applicant appealed to the Superior Court for
judicial review of DCI’s decision.
The applicant requested judicial review of the exemption denial, arguing that
geotechnical experts confirmed that their proposal would better stabilize the slope in
question, which would qualify them for an exemption. DCI argued that the Superior Court
had no jurisdiction over the case because the applicant had failed to exhaust administrative
remedies, specifically a Director’s Interpretation, which clarifies the application of
regulations to a specific property. DCI also claimed that the denial of the exemption was not
a final decision on the land use application, merely a clarification of the standards by which
the project was subjected to. The Superior Court dismissed the applicant’s claims.

Dispute 11 – 2008 – 42nd Ave NE., Cedar Park
DCI approved an application to sub plat a property into four parcels in the Cedar Park
neighborhood of North Seattle (Figure 1). DCI also issued a Determination of
Nonsignificance as required by SEPA guidelines, indicating its view that that proposal posed
no detrimental impact to the environment. The applicant’s plan was to demolish the existing
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structure atop the property and to develop a single-family home in each of the four parcels,
which would be subject to a separate application process. Though much of the property was
flat, its eastern end sloped downhill toward the Burke Gilman trail, which is adjacent to Lake
Washington. Presence of the steep slope meant that part of the property was considered to be
in an ECA. The bottom half of the slope below the property had been subject to landslides in
the past. At the time, the street’s drainage control relied on a ditch and culvert system, which
overflowed during heavy rain. When this occurred, water flowed over the edge of the slope.
The applicant’s geotechnical engineer asserted that the sub plat proposal posed no
risk to the slope because it did not yet involve any construction. However, he suggested that
development on the property was feasible with proper engineering, writing in the
geotechnical report that the property was “suitable for the proposed development using
appropriate conventional design and construction procedures.”
DCI based its approval of the sub plat on the evaluation of several factors. First, it
relied on its own drainage review, which found that the current system of storm water control
was lacking; it conditioned its approval on the development of a new drainage control plan to
divert water to a drainage collection line in the main street. Second, DCI’s geotechnical
engineer evaluated the geotechnical report prepared by the applicant’s geotechnical engineer,
which affirmed the feasibility of future development on the site. DCI’s geotechnical engineer
agreed with this report. Third, DCI determined that the current property could be subdivided
into four parcels and still meet minimum lot size. Finally, DCI determined that, as required
by Land Use Code, the short plat meets “the public use and interests,” because it provides
additional housing stock.
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Friends of Cedar Park Neighborhood, a community group, appealed the approval of
the short plat application, arguing that the DCI’s evaluation of drainage adequacy, lot size,
and ‘public use and interests,’ was erroneous. The appellants argued that both the current
drainage system and the drainage condition imposed by DCI were inadequate. Appellants
provided the Hearing Examiner with their firsthand observations supporting the assertion that
the subject property experiences drainage issues too extensive to rectify with the drainage
condition imposed by DCI. However, drainage studies performed by both the applicant’s and
the City’s geotechnical engineers indicated that drainage from future development on the
property would flow away from the slope and sufficiently control storm water. The
appellants also claimed that only three lots, not four, could reasonably fit on the property,
hypothesizing that garage structures for each house would be large, thus reducing space for
required setbacks. Finally, the appellants argued that the short plat did not meet the ‘public
use and interests’ because increasing density diminishes the property’s compatibility with the
rest of the neighborhood.
The Hearing Examiner dismissed the claim that only three lots could fit on the property
because it was based on speculation, and did not consider all possible design scenarios.
Concerning the claim that construction of four structures would increase density, the Hearing
Examiner concluded that each parcel met minimum lot requirements for its single-family
residential zone, and thus the four parcels would not be any denser than other adjacent
properties. The appellants’ drainage concerns were similarly dismissed for lack of evidence
to contradict the studies performed by licensed geotechnical engineers. The Hearing
Examiner affirmed the Director’s decision to approve the sub plat, but reiterated the
requirement that the applicant submit a new drainage control plan to DCI.
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Dispute 12 – 2009 – Westlake Ave N., South Lake Union
DCI issued a DNS for a proposal to demolish two buildings and construct a six-story
office building on a large parcel in South Lake Union (Figure 1). Parts of the site of proposed
development were mapped as steep slope, potential earthquake, and potential liquefaction.
The applicant’s application for an exemption from steep slope regulations was granted
because the steep slopes on site had been created by previous, legal grading. The applicant
had cited several geotechnical studies that supported the claim that the slopes had been
created by grading.
The property management company that managed buildings adjacent to the proposal
site appealed DCI’s issuance of the DNS. The appellants’ primary grievance was the loss of
views of Lake Union that would result with the development of the six-story structure. The
appellants prepared a three-dimensional view impact report, which included vantage points
from Dexter Avenue looking toward Lake Union with and without the proposed
development. The appellant argued that the blockage of views of Lake Union would be
inconsistent with SEPA, which protects public views of certain natural features, including
Lake Union. The appellants argued that the size of the proposed development was out of
character with existing development in the area, but presented no evidence to demonstrate
this.
The appellants suggested that the proposal should have been required to undergo an
Environmental Impact Statement based on the presence of ECAs on site, arguing that the
potential impacts of these areas required further review and mitigation measures. However,
no evidence was produced to support the claim that significant adverse impacts to the
environment would occur because of the development.
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In regards to the appellants’ concerns about view impacts, the Hearing Examiner
noted that not all views of the lake from Dexter Avenue would be lost, citing a setback at the
north side of the proposed development that would preserve views from Dexter Avenue. The
Hearing Examiner acknowledged that views of the lake would be lost, but that no
“reasonable mitigation” existed to alleviate the view loss. The Hearing Examiner affirmed
the Director’s decision to issue the DNS.

Patterns Identified in Disputes
Taken together, the twelve disputes that I selected for in-depth analysis provide a
nuanced view into the actions of applicants, appellants, and regulatory agency and the
outcomes of typical disputes in Seattle over the regulation of development on landslide-prone
slopes. Out of twelve disputes, seven are characterized by neighbors appealing the approval
of development in either its entirety or its extent, four are characterized by applicants
appealing denials or conditions of development, and one is characterized by homeowners
suing the City for allowing development to occur. Eleven disputes concern pre-development
decisions about whether to allow development in the ECA, and under what conditions. Table
3 summarizes all twelve disputes, appellant concern, and legal outcome.

Table 2. Dispute Summaries
DISPUTE
#

YEAR

APPELLANT
TYPE

1

19901995

Applicant

2

1991

Neighbor

3

1993

Applicant

CONCERNS

OUTCOME

Property rights, slope stability,
profitability

Court ruled in favor of applicant;
development allowed

Views, wildlife, slope stability

DCI decision affirmed;
development allowed

Property rights, slope stability

DCI decision affirmed;
development allowed without
regulatory relief
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Views, wildlife and vegetation,
parking, noise, slope stability

DCI decision affirmed;
development allowed

Slope stability

DCI decision affirmed;
development allowed with
conditions

Costs of landslide damages

Parties settled out of court

Neighbor

Density, traffic, parking, drainage,
slope stability

DCI decision affirmed;
development allowed

2000

Neighbor

Slope stability, drainage,
vegetation, parking, structure size,
alley crowding

DCI decision affirmed;
development allowed

9

2002

Applicant

Slope stability

DCI decision affirmed;
development condemned

10

2006

Applicant

Property rights, slope stability

Court dismissed applicant's
claims

11

2008

Neighbor

Drainage, lot size

DCI decision affirmed;
development allowed

12

2009

Neighbor

Views, hazard areas

DCI decision affirmed;
development allowed

4

1994

Neighbor

5

1997

Neighbor

6

19972003

Plaintiff

7

1998

8

Two major patterns are evident from analysis of these disputes. The first is that a
Hearing Examiner is likely to affirm any decision made by DCI, regardless of whether that
decision allows, denies, or restricts development. In fact, there were no cases examined in
which a Hearing Examiner reversed a decision made by DCI and sided with an appellant.
The second pattern is that neighbor appellants rarely if ever succeed in blocking or restricting
development by appealing a DCI decision, though neighbors protesting development
characterized a majority of disputes analyzed.
The two patterns are interrelated and can be explained by the nature of the appeal
system. An appeal implies that a decision has already been made by DCI. Thus, in an appeal,
appellants question the validity of a government agency’s decision. Appellants must prove
that an error was made in the decision-making process by providing evidence that the
decision was inconsistent with relevant policies and regulations, or that the information upon
which that decision was based was flawed. Providing evidence that creates ambiguity around
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the validity of a decision is insufficient; according to the Seattle Municipal Code, the Hearing
Examiner must give “substantial weight” to the Director’s decision, therefore, appellants
must provide evidence that overwhelmingly demonstrates DCI erred. In other words, the
appellants must provide information supporting their desired outcome that is more
compelling than the information upon which DCI based its decision. Hearing Examiners are
unlikely to favor appellants unless strong evidence suggests DCI erred, and neighbors are
unlikely to provide that strong evidence. On the other hand, applicants are required to
provide extensive information to DCI when applying for a permit. Because DCI’s decision is
implicitly based on extensive information provided by applicants, the appeal process
systemically gives preference to its decision.
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Chapter 7 – Analysis: Trends in Dispute outcomes
An analysis of the arguments made in the disputes described in the previous chapter,
along with the information that actors tend to use in their arguments, helps to illustrate the
complex relationship between science and policy, as influenced by diverse actor interests. In
this chapter, I will give a short description of the patterns identified in the twelve disputes,
and explain these patterns as functions of actor interests and preferred outcomes and the
types of information that different types of actors tend to use. I will then address the themes
identified in the broader narrative analysis, which are ‘liability,’ ‘engineering safety,’
‘acceptable risk,’ and ‘contradiction. These themes are discussed in their relation to defining
actor interests and arguments. The final chapter will situate these themes within the ST&S
literature on the role of science in policy decisions, and how it plays out in these cases where
private property intersects with public safety.
Actors and their Interests
In the twelve disputes analyzed, four primary actors can be identified; applicants for
development projects, neighbors who have concerns about development projects,
government agencies, and consulted technical experts. These four actors participate in the
dispute process playing the roles of applicant, appellant, government, and expert. In court
cases, the role of plaintiff, which is analogous to the role of appellant, and the role of
defendant are relevant. An actor may, in fact, plays more than one role — an applicant may
also be the appellant (Disputes 1, 3, 9, and 10), or different government agencies may play
the roles of both mediator and defendant (1, 3, 6, 9, and 10).
Across the twelve disputes, immediate interests of actors are generally consistent.
Applicants have an interest in developing property that happens to be in an ECA. With the
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exception of dispute 6, which concerns past development, all cases are concerned with
prospective development in areas considered landslide-prone, either because they have been
mapped as such or because they have steep slopes. Despite a property’s ECA status,
applicants look to develop property as an investment, and a quality of neighborhood and
views increase the value of that investment. In eight disputes, the subject property
overlooked a body of water, and many were located within popular residential
neighborhoods.
While an applicant’s interest is in development of a specific property, neighbors have
an interest in maintaining their quality of living and are concerned with the impact
development will have on their views of the landscape, parking availability, current
neighborhood density, environmental health, and slope stability. In three disputes (4, 7, and
8) appellants specifically expressed concerns about the negative impact development would
have on parking and traffic in their neighborhood. In three disputes (2, 4 and 12) appellants
were concerned that new development would block view of the landscape from their
properties. In six disputes (2, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 11) appellants had environmental concerns
regarding either the stability of the slope or the retention of trees and wildlife. The common
theme evident among neighbor concerns is the maintenance of the neighborhood’s current
quality — environmentally, aesthetically, and in ease of access.
Olshansky (1996) emphasizes aesthetics as a value upon which neighbors commonly
object to landslide-prone slope development. Nearby neighbors often have an interest in
maintaining their views, levels of natural light, and privacy, and distant neighbors may share
similar concerns. Olshansky (1996) suggests that hillsides contribute to a community’s sense
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of place and identity, and thus even distant neighbors may dislike, and object to, new hillside
development, perceiving that new development visually disrupts the landscape.
The government has an interest in regulating development in ECAs in consistence
with local and state policies and regulations. DCI is bounded by Seattle’s ECA regulations in
its decision-making about ECA areas. The enforcement of ECA regulations reduces the
City’s risk of being held liable for future landslide damages if it has held the subject
development to all applicable standards. One government geologist involved with permitting
said:
We’re in a position where we can’t really prevent people from using their property,
that’s a taking. And so that’s why the code says we have to meet these certain
standards. . . . [I]f you can’t provide a clean source of drinking water, you can’t build
a house. If you can’t design a septic system for these soils, you can’t build a house. If
you can’t mitigate the landslide, then we would say you can’t build the house, and
then they might go to the Hearing Examiner. . . . [I]n any case, we’ve done our part in
meeting that code (Anonymous, personal communication, February 19, 2016).

In theory, a geotechnical expert, or other consulted expert is to evaluate the physical
characteristics of a site and make recommendations as to whether or not a site can safely be
developed. However, some planners and geologists interviewed suggested that some expert
consultants provide reports that are consistent with client needs because that client pays the
consultant’s salary. In those cases, a consultant can be seen as having the same interests as
the client. While a geotechnical consultant interviewed agreed that in cases of permitting,
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clients expect recommendations from their consultants, he believed that the interests of
geotechnical consultants were more consistent than those of government agencies:
You would assume that geotechs would have the same character decade after decade,
either in support or not for development. You would think engineering practice would
have a much more consistent practice in the way that they interpret information. A
permitting agency would be much more constricted by conflict, their need to promote
or restrict growth, who the mayor is. [Depending on those factors], suddenly you see
more slopes built on (Anonymous, personal communication, April 14, 2016).

Applicants, neighbor appellants, government, and sometimes vocal expert
consultants, advocate for outcomes that are consistent with their interests. In permitting
disputes, applicants advocate for the allowance of development with minimal conditioning,
and neighbor appellants advocate for the denial or restriction of development. The
government’s interest in regulating development does not result in necessary advocacy for
either the allowance or denial of development; in theory, it advocates for whatever outcome
it perceives as being consistent with its regulations. For example, the Hearing Examiner
upheld the restriction or denial of development in four disputes (1, 3, 9, and 10), and upheld
approval of development in seven cases (2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, and 12).
Each actor’s preferred outcome can be placed on a spectrum that ranges from low risk
acceptability to higher risk acceptability, as illustrated in Figure 3. Low risk acceptability is
characterized by risk-adversity and an avoidance-based risk regulation, and higher risk
acceptability is characterized by more flexible risk regulation, and the notion that proper
engineering will mitigate for risk. Proponents of engineering mitigation may not associate
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themselves with ‘higher risk acceptability’ because engineering reduces risk. Yet because
development within an ECA inherently involves more exposure to hazards than avoidance of
ECAs, I have characterized it as comparatively ‘higher’ risk. The difference between points
on the spectrum may be understood as the margin of acceptable risk between actors.
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Figure 4 – Actor perspectives and preferred outcomes can be placed on a spectrum of
acceptable risk, with low risk acceptability characterized by risk-adversity and hazard
avoidance, and higher risk acceptability characterized by property rights and engineering
stability.

The outcomes advocated for by neighbor appellants fall on the low risk acceptability
side of the spectrum; these actors typically want to block or restrict development in ECAs
because they perceive development as a threat to their quality of life. The outcomes
advocated for by applicants fall on the higher risk acceptability side of the spectrum; these
actors want to develop in ECAs and hire engineers to help them minimize risk in developing
their property. The outcomes advocated for by DCI or the Hearing Examiner, while not
consistently pro- or anti-development, fall somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. The
GMA, Comprehensive Plan, and ECA regulations call for maximum avoidance of ECAs, and
Seattle is considered to have one of the most progressive regulatory frameworks for hazard
risk, which is consistent with low risk acceptability. However, the City simultaneously
allows private development to occur in ECAs where adequate mitigation can be
demonstrated, which is consistent with higher risk acceptability.
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Figure 5. The preferred outcomes of neighbor appellants are generally characterized by low risk
acceptability, while the preferred outcomes of applicants are characterized by high risk
acceptability. Positions of actors may shift on the spectrum under different circumstances.

Across time, individuals may play the roles of different actors, and may advocate for
outcomes that are on different points of the spectrum. Outcomes actors advocate for in a
single case do not necessarily represent their general political views about property rights,
hazard regulation, or government oversight. For example, while the preferred outcome of
neighbor appellants to block or restrict development aligns with an avoidance approach to
hazard risk, many of their grievances about development are commonly non-hazard related,
and concern views of the landscape, aesthetic character, parking, and traffic. This suggests
that, in another context, a neighbor appellant may advocate for an outcome that is consistent
with higher risk acceptability, because the individual does not operate on a low risk
acceptability platform per se.

The Typical Nature of Appellant Arguments
In the twelve case studies, neighbor appellants typically expressed their concerns
about development in frames of fairness and decency. For example, neighbors commonly
suggested that the proposed development would diminish their quality of life in its negative
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impact on views, parking and traffic, and neighborhood character. In some cases, neighbor
appellants pointed to specific policies that discouraged these impacts, such as SEPA’s
protection of public views, or the Comprehensive Plan’s policy that new development be
‘compatible’ with the surrounding neighborhood, yet neighbor appellants provided little
concrete evidence, legal or technical, that suggested a policy or code was being violated.
Neighbor appellants tended to rely on eyewitness observation in arguing for their
interests on environmental issues that typically warrant scientific or technical studies. In
dispute 2, appellants pointed to cracks in a neighbor’s yard to demonstrate slope instability.
In dispute 5, the appellant testified that the clay she had found in her yard was evidence that
the area was characterized by the landslide-prone combination of sand overlying clay. In
dispute 7, appellants noted that a church downhill of proposed development regularly
flooded, and claimed that this demonstrated that the site of proposed development
experienced drainage issues. Appellants in dispute 11 similarly noted that they had witnessed
surface water running off a slope on the property of proposed developing, claiming the site
experienced severe drainage issues.
When neighborhood appellants did address science or technical data, it was typically
by qualitatively challenging the adequacy of science and technical information upon which a
decision was based. A common claim by neighborhood appellants was that not enough
information had been gathered to make a well-formed decision about how, or whether,
development should proceed. For example, many appellants challenged the issuance of a
SEPA Determination of Nonsignificance, arguing instead, that DCI should have required the
applicant to do an Environmental Impact Statement, which would require more data
gathering about the site.
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Appellants typically listed several reasons for their opposition to development, but
failed to substantiate most of their claims. Often, a single issue was highlighted as the
primary point of concern and typically, this issue was aesthetic. For example, in dispute 2,
appellants expressed concerns about views, wildlife retention, and slope stability, but only
provided substantial evidence for how views from the apartment building owned by the
appellants would be blocked. In dispute 8, appellants expressed concerns about slope
stability, parking availability, tree retention, noise, alley crowding, and structure height.
However, appellants did not present evidence to support their opposition to any of their
stated environmental concerns. The Hearing Examiner noted that:
The appellant in this case was straightforward in its desire to block the entire project,
and it is not difficult to appreciate that sentiment. The appellant fears that this project,
particularly if should serve as a precedent for future projects, will irreversibly change
the character of the immediately surrounding area (City of Seattle Hearing Examiner,
2000).

In dispute 12, appellants argued that an environmental impact statement should have
been required to address the property’s hazard risk, which included landslide, earthquake,
and liquefaction, but provided no evidence supporting the claim that further studies were
needed. Instead, the majority of evidence provided by appellants concerned the impact the
proposed development would have on views of Lake Union from the property owned by the
appellants.
In disputes 2, 8, and 12, it can be speculated that appellants used environmental
concerns like slope stability and wildlife retention to leverage their case, when their primary
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concern was aesthetic. In none of these cases, however, did appellants use science to support
their claims about slope stability or environment. Rather, appellants provided personal
observations to support their claims or they claimed that not enough information was known.
One appellant demonstrated genuine concern for the environmental impact of
proposed developing, including slope stability. In dispute 5, the appellant’s argument
revolved solely around the issue of slope stability. The appellant went so far as to hire her
own geotechnical engineer to evaluate the stability of the subject slope. What was unique
about dispute 5 was that the appellant’s property was directly adjacent to the subject lot, both
properties on a steep slope in an area that had experienced landslides. The appellant feared
that the proposed development posed an immediate threat to the stability of her property.
In contrast, at least some appellants who voiced concerns about slope stability can be
identified as living in or owning property that would likely not be affected by soil movement
on the property where development was proposed. For example, the property owned by
appellants in dispute 8 was separated form the subject site by at least the width of an arterial
street. Neighbors who plausibly are not put at risk by slope instability issues on a different
property nonetheless express slope stability concerns in their appeals. While this may be an
example of ‘love thy neighbor’ civic action with genuine neighborly concern for the welfare
of future occupants of the development, it is more likely that the expression of stability
concerns is a superficial attempt to maximize likelihood of success in blocking or restricting
development.
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Applicants and Government Use Highly Technical Information
Despite the considerable concern that applicants and appellants have over issues of
aesthetics, property rights, and neighborhood character, applicants and DCI consistently use
science and technical information in arguing for their interests. At its submittal phase a land
use application presents abundant science and technical information as dictated by
application requirements. Applicants are required to submit with their land use applications
several technical reports about the site prepared by licensed professionals. These reports,
often prepared by geotechnical consultants, include conditions to which development should
adhere to minimize environmental risk.
An approved land use application indicates extensive technical study and review
about a subject site and proposal. DCI relies on at least three sources of science and technical
information in its review process: the technical studies submitted by an applicant, expert
review of the applicant’s data, and the science and technical information implied or
referenced within the ECA Code. DCI uses the expertise of its geotechnical engineer and
sometimes that of other government agencies to review technical studies prepared by the
applicant’s hired experts.
In its decision making process, DCI evaluates whether a proposal is consistent with
all standards within the ECA code. These codes are implicitly based on technical expert
knowledge and ‘best available science,’ as requires through the Growth Management Act.
Jurisdictions are left to compile or commission scientific studies about critical areas,
determine which are the ‘best,’ and incorporate that information into policy (Department of
Community, Trade, and Economic Development, 2007). In Seattle, ‘best available science’
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for geologic hazardous areas is periodically reviewed and incorporated into critical area code
updates.
Some parts of the ECA code directly reference scientific studies, such as the area of
the code defining and delineating ECAs. Other parts of the code do not directly reference
studies from which it draws its standards, but implies, by virtue of its basis on ‘best available
science’, that it is based in expert knowledge. Seattle is unique in that it has five seasoned
geotechnical engineers on staff at DCI to help translate ‘best available science’ into code
standards, and to review permits for proposals in geologic hazard areas. However, other
jurisdictions may hire consultants to help develop code from ‘best available science’ and may
rely on planners without geotechnical expertise or third parties to review proposals that
require geotechnical reports.
While applicants and government agencies tend to have the resources to make
science-based and technical arguments, appellants tend to rely on values-based arguments, or
lack access to scientific and technical data to support their positions. The submittal of a land
use application in a landslide-prone area requires an applicant to obtain extensive technical
information about a site. The application review process similarly revolves around technical
information and science, with DCI geotechnical engineers reviewing proposals and ensuring
consistency with an ECA code that is based on ‘best available science.’ In contrast, neighbor
to applicants and government, neighbor appellants, usually non-scientists, are tasked with
providing more compelling information that challenges the conclusions drawn by multiple
technical experts. Either without access to science and technical expertise, or unaware that
the appeal system requires proof of unequivocal error, neighbor appellants rarely provide
such information.
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The Role of Science and Scientists in Producing Dispute Outcomes
In appeals where applicants contest denials or restrictions on development by DCI,
which characterize four of the sample appeals (Disputes 1, 3, 9, and 10), both actors typically
employ scientific and technical data to support their respective arguments. Applicants rely on
the required technical studies previously performed by their geotechnical expert, and often
enlist those experts to testify at the appeal hearing. DCI relies on its own experts, including
geotechnical engineers within DCI and those in other government agencies, to provide
credible testimony in support of its argument. A manager at DCI said, “I think we’re ahead
because we have the landslide database, and more importantly, we have the geotechnical
expertise in house. So [proposals are] getting review by people who know when an analysis
is not adequate” (Anonymous, personal communication, May 3, 2016).
Both DCI and applicants rely on science and technical information to develop and
support their arguments. The applicant’s consultant provides science and technical
information about a site supporting development, or specific extents of development, and
DCI experts analyze information about the same site in a way that supports the restriction or
denial of development. In the sampled disputes, these actors come to conflicting conclusions
about what action ought to be taken for one or both of the following reasons:


The two actors disagreed about the implications of the science and technical
information about the site (Disputes 9 and 10)



The applicant disagreed with the validity of the science that underlie the regulations
(Disputes 1 and 3)

In these cases, an actor’s position may be influenced by their preferred outcome. Some
developers have claimed that to the extent that ECA regulations restrict development, the
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government’s preferred outcome is restricted or non-development, so that it can preserve
green space in the City at no cost (Beason, 1995; Hadley, 1997; Hadley, 1998). However, at
face value, the preferred outcome of the government is that which is consistent with local
and state policies and regulations. This preferred outcome may be development, restricted
development, or no development. In this light, the government has no singular outcome that
it prefers.

Actors and Preferred Outcomes
An applicant’s preferred outcome is transparent; he or she wishes to develop and will
invest many resources to ensure that development occurs. The preferred outcome of the
applicant’s geotechnical consultant is a more complex question; a geotechnical consultant is
hired to professionally assess the state of the site conditions and make recommendations for
development to mitigate for risk, which officially puts consultants in a neutral role which no
preferred outcome.
However, several geologists and planners who were interviewed argued that some
consultants are concerned primarily with achieving the client’s preferred outcome of
development, even for proposals with irreconcilably hazardous elements.
As one government geologist noted:
Oddly enough, in lawsuits, you’ll have a scientist hired by this party who is making
one argument and a ‘scientist’ hired by the other party making the opposite argument
off of the same set of facts. And the idea that they are being completely objective, and
just coincidentally happened to come to the conclusion in support of their client’s
argument, is just ridiculous. . . . I’m not saying they don’t have scientific integrity, or
that they’re crooks, but any party to a lawsuit can find an ‘expert’ who can tell them
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what they want to hear if they shop around (Anonymous, personal communication,
February 22, 2016).

One government planner interviewed emphasized that clients pay a consultant’s
salary, a setup that implicitly pressures a consultant to provide recommendations that favor
the preferred outcome of the client, “You can pay for what you want, which is strange
because you’d think science is science, right?” (Anonymous, personal communication,
February 25, 2016).
An independent geotechnical consultant interviewed agreed with the notion that ‘you
get what you pay for,’ and even conceded that in permitting situations, clients generally
expect positive recommendations from their geotechnical consultant. He explained that
obtaining more precise and more accurate data about a site requires more sophisticated and
costly study methods, amounting it to, “money in, data out.” A client willing to spend more
money will receive a more detailed geotechnical report, and will have access to more
sophisticated structural designs, “With more money comes more certainty. We’re taught that
anything is possible” (Anonymous, personal communication, April 14, 2016).
Within the sampled cases, consultants most often disagreed with government experts
about the implications of site conditions for development. In disputes 1 and 3, consultants
questioned the science that underlie the ECA regulations. Notably, three unpaid geologists
and engineers testified on behalf of the applicant in dispute 1, expressing professional
concerns that specific parts of the regulations might systematically impede stabilization of
slopes. That three unpaid scientists would volunteer to testify in a dispute indicates that even
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outside of consulting positions, scientists hold their own beliefs about how risk ought to be
regulated. Some may publically advocate on behalf of their beliefs and others may not.

Actor Narratives and Fundamental Perspectives on Landslide Hazards
Four primary nodes, or themes, were evident in the content analysis of 12 disputes, 11
interviews, and 127 news articles. The theme of ‘liability’ was referenced 76 times, the most
out of all nodes. It was followed by ‘engineering safety’ (34 references), ‘acceptable risk’ (26
references) and the broad theme of ‘contradiction’ (25 references). These four themes, all of
them interconnected, help to illustrate the fundamental perspectives of some actors, and
therefore the origins of their preferred outcomes and arguments used in disputes.
Liability and Contradiction. In a post-disaster context, one of the most salient
questions is, ‘Who is to blame?’ Assigning blame not only helps victims and observers make
sense of what occurred, but through lawsuits and payouts, it can financially fast-track
recovery. Governments are often perceived as liable for disasters because they are
responsible for developing the regulations that dictate where development occurs.
Governments are also generally understood as responsible for informing their population
about hazard risk. Disaster victims often sue the government claiming that it fell short of its
responsibility to protect the population from hazards. Seattle’s municipal government, for
example, has fought lawsuits arising from landslide-related damages for over 100 years.
Often, lawsuits claim that the City was negligent, either in allowing development to occur in
a hazardous area or for inadvertently triggering a landslide by failing to maintain drainage
systems on public land.
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Seattle has been involved in several highly publicized lawsuits over landslide
damages over the past century, often following widespread landsliding from heavy rainfall.
In the early 1930s, the City was sued for a total of over $600,000 (nearly $11 million in 2016
dollars) by homeowners alleging the Seattle had failed to maintain its drainage systems
(Maier, 1997a). The City was similarly involved in multiple lawsuits after the 1996-97 winter
landslides, including the one detailed in dispute 6. In dispute 6, appellants sued the City for
negligence after three townhomes were rendered uninhabitable by landslide after the 1996-97
winter storms. That dispute reached the Supreme Court of Washington. In dispute 6, the City
offered the plaintiffs a settlement, precluding the legal costs of prolonging the court battle.
Lawsuits not only cost governments money, but also threaten to set legal precedents,
which can translate into greater future costs. In dispute 6, the lawsuit against the City
threatened to set a precedent for government liability when hazards damaged structures that it
had permitted to be built. To avoid such a precedent, the City fought the lawsuit to the
Supreme Court, which, as noted in a Seattle Times article at the time, was unusual given that
Seattle had been undergoing budget cuts (Young, 2003).
Currently, Snohomish County and Washington state are defending themselves in
several wrongful-death suits over the Oso landslide of 2014. Those lawsuits allege that the
government failed to inform citizens of the hazard risk, that it negligently issued logging
permits, and that its structural mitigation for flood hazard contributed to the landslide
(Blankstein, 2016).
Governments are often faced with a tenuous balancing act of mitigating for hazard
risk while meeting the interests and needs of those in the present — interests that may
directly conflict with one another. From a government’s perspective, avoiding liability is
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difficult; many policies that are effective at mitigating for hazard risk are unpopular. In many
cases, risk-averse policies directly conflict with the interests of homeowners, developers, and
even governments. For example, banning or strictly regulating development in hazardous
areas, which may prevent disaster, conflicts with the interests of landowners and developers
who want to improve the value of their land, lowers an area’s housing stock, and reduces a
government’s tax base. Attempts to limit development are often met with strong opposition
from property rights proponents, and in many cases, involve lawsuits that allege government
taking of private property. Yet, sometimes, those that sue for the right to build in a hazardous
area later hold the government liable when a hazard damages their property. Media and
citizens alike took noted and publically criticized this pattern. Describing these homeowners
in 1997, Seattle Times reporters wrote:
They have complained, cajoled and sued in an effort to find their way around
government regulations intended to protect the environment and their well-being.
And on occasion, when nature laid claim to their investments, they turned again to
government to rescue them, protect their property from vandalism and shore up
hillsides from future slides (Nelson & Ostrom, 1997).

A 1998 letter to the editor of Seattle Times was more explicit in its criticism:
I am tired of hearing about homeowners who knowingly build in critical areas in
Seattle and then turn around and sue the city when any type of damage occurs… The
city (and taxpayers) should not be held accountable for damage that is caused by
natural forces for people who build in critical areas. When homeowners buy property
in these type of areas, they often enjoy unobstructable views that can be found

104
nowhere else, but they must also take the risk and pay the price. The city cannot and
should not be responsible for all drainage problems either. City officials do not have
crystal balls, and it is time for homeowners to accept responsibility regarding their
decision to build in these high-risk areas. I am sick and tired of people blaming the
city and in turn, filing lawsuits (Merz. 1998).

That the government can be sued for restricting development and for allowing
development, presents a contradiction that policymakers struggle to reconcile. Disputes 1 and
10 demonstrate that the government may be sued for not allowing development in ECAs, and
dispute 6 demonstrates that the government may also be sued for allowing development in
ECAs after a hazard occurs. Faced with the prospect of being sued either way, policymakers
in Seattle have developed a regulatory framework that allows development in ECAs, but
regulates it in a way that minimizes the government’s culpability in a future disaster.
Development standards enforced by DCI are meant to lower probability of slope and
structure failure, and because those standards are based on ‘best available science,’ they
indicate that development is the most robust it can be. Apart from blocking development in
hazard areas, holding development to the highest development standards is the best strategy a
government can take in avoiding permitting-based liability claims after a disaster. When
people try to sidestep these standards, they effectively heighten a government’s potential for
a liability suit should a disaster occur. In this light, government denial of regulatory relief,
and its subsequent defense of that denial upon appeal sometimes all the way up into court,
indicates the government’s evaluation. Denial indicates the government has determined that
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the grant of regulatory relief could potentially cause harm to people and property and also
leave the government liable for that harm.
Acceptable Risk. The UNISDR (2009) defines acceptable risk as “The level of
potential losses that a society or community considers acceptable given existing social,
economic, political, cultural, technical and environmental conditions.” Acceptable risk may
be determined by a community or individual’s cultural and religious views, economic status,
or perceived benefits of accepting a situation in which risk is present. In the large majority of
cases in which text was coded at the node ‘Acceptable Risk,’ the term referred to the
psychological tension of desiring the views afforded by a location highly susceptible to
landsliding. Homeowners weigh the perceived level of landslide risk against the benefits of
the option in which risk is produce. In the context of Seattle and other highly developed
areas, the benefits of living in a location with landslide risk are typically beautiful views and
preferable neighborhood.
According to a University of Washington geologist interviewed:
There are very interesting differences in how we manage landslide hazards as
societies. To compare Rio de Janeiro to Seattle, in Seattle you look at that map of
landslide prone slopes and then you look at property values and a lot of the expensive
land is in slide prone stuff - the coastal bluffs, great views, views I’ll never be able to
afford. You go to Rio and you look at this topographic similar place on the steep
slopes … and what you find are favelas, you don’t find McMansions. Why? Well,
their people are not willing to take that risk. And so it’s basically poor people [there],
and that’s the land that’s available to them (Anonymous, personal communication,
September 25, 2016).
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Slovic et al. (1979) suggests that risks are more acceptable when they are perceived
as voluntary and that heuristics play a large role in determining whether there is a significant
risk or not. Known as the “psychometric paradigm” within risk perception studies, it is
argued that individuals make complicated risk-related decisions using mental shortcuts. Thus,
perceptions based on recent experience, emotions toward actions or events, or media
exposure determine what level of risk is perceived and will in turn affect whether that risk is
acceptable in light of any associated benefits. It is important to note that it is not risk per se
that is acceptable, but the option that is associated with that risk. Individuals accept options
that are associated with both risk and benefits. The ratio of cost and benefit makes an option
acceptable (Fischoff et al., 1981).
Alhakami & Slovic (1994) found that perceived levels of risk and inversely
associated with perceived benefit. In other words, humans often perceive that the option
associated with the highest benefit has the lowest risk, when in reality the two are often
positively correlated. This perceptive tendency may be due to denial, which Slovic et al.
(1979) describes as a heuristical reaction to uncertainty of risk. Individuals, when faced with
the anxiety of uncertain risk, may suppress it altogether. This could explain the tendency to
diminish the high risks associated with high benefits. In Seattle, residents may not perceive
high landslide risks due to the perceived high benefits of living in a location with beautiful
views and in a desirable neighborhood. Accordingly, they may not agree with perceivably
overly stringent regulations set forth by the government for development on their property.
As one government geologist explained:

107
There’s a lot of people who are willing to take on that risk and I’ve been asked a
number of times, ‘Why can’t I just build this, I’m willing to take on the risk.’ And my
answer is always ‘Yeah, you are, but is your wife? How about your kids? The people
who come visit? What about the next people who own this place? Because on the
average, you’re going to sell in seven years. What then?’ So I have to hold them to
some standard and that standard is set up by the [ECA] code (Anonymous, personal
communication, February 18, 2016).

Appellants in disputes 1, 3, 9, and 10 claimed that development as planned in their
proposals would stabilize the slopes in question, thus reducing risk of slope movement. Their
claims that development would produce stability can be framed as a severe example of
psychologically diminishing risk, of having an excellent engineer, or both.
Engineering Safety. Geotechnical engineers and many developers and homeowners
argue that the appropriate way to address landslide risk is through proper engineering that
reinforces the structure and slope, an argument that runs counter to the philosophy that highly
hazardous areas should simply be avoided. Seattle’s ECA regulations acknowledge both
arguments, outlining that development in landslide-prone areas should generally be avoided
unless an applicant can demonstrate that a project can meet specific standards of mitigation.
Scientists fall on both sides of the debate. Neil Twelker, a veteran geotechnical
engineer in Seattle, was a proponent of risk reduction through human ingenuity and structural
approaches. He told the Seattle Times in 1997, “Look, most of the slides I know have been
on undeveloped property…It really depresses me when people in my own profession get out
and say, `It's caused by development or overdevelopment.' Development doesn't do that at
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all” (Nelson & Ostrom, 1997). Donald Tubbs, a geologist, geotechnical engineer, and
considered one of the grandfathers of landslide studies in Seattle, shares the same view that
Twelker did. He told the Seattle Times in 1999 that, “I would feel perfectly comfortable
living in a landslide hazard area, if the house was properly engineered” (Barber, 1999). As
Twelker’s and Tubb’s quotes to the Seattle Times demonstrate, both geotechnical engineers
conceive their role as experts to go beyond assessing risk, and like scientists that write opeds, are vocal about their policy views.
Few question that modern geotechnical engineering methods have the capability to
reduce the risk of living in a landslide hazard area, but even the most sophisticated
geotechnical engineering techniques do not eliminate all risk of landslide. The ideological
debate lies in whether humans should be willfully exposed to landslide hazard risk at all;
many believe that certain hazardous areas should be completely avoided, either through
personal choice or through legislation. Others believe that slopes can be safely built on with
the right engineering. Fundamentally, the debate about whether to engineer the slope or
whether to avoid the slope comes down to what level of risk is acceptable and this level may
change drastically depending on the individual. For homeowners and developers who
challenge a decision to deny a permit to build in an ECA, they are expressing not only their
faith in the science of engineering, but their personal willingness to accept the balance of risk
that engineering methods leave, regardless of impacts to others. In contrast, neighbor
appellants who challenge permits to develop landslide-prone or steep slopes may be
expressing their misgivings about the viability of engineered solutions, or at least engineered
solutions devised by a technical expert paid by a risk-accepting landowner, and their concern
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of increased risk exposure with none of the accompanying benefits their neighbor will
receive.
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Chapter 8 – Scientists, culture, and policy
Science and technical information are used extensively by applicants and government
agencies in justifying their positions in disputes about landslide regulations in Seattle.
Neighbor appellants, however, seldom invoke science and technical information to justify
their positions, and instead rely on moral arguments of fairness and decency. Yet, all actors
operate on values to an extent, even if they use science and technical information to support
their arguments. Applicants and neighbors share a value of aesthetics, with both actors acting
on desires for views of the landscape. Property rights and engineering safety are also
discernible values of applicants. The government theoretically shares the public’s values, but
is also concerned with the prospects of liability and lawsuit, and these concerns guide
government policy. Actor arguments and values as they relate to disputes about development
in landslide-prone areas can be better understood when contextualized within the theoretical
literature of ST&S.
Like the environmental issues of climate change, vaccines, and GMOs, debates about
landslide regulation are characterized in part by values-based arguments. In many of the
cases analyzed, the values-based arguments are masked by science arguments, as is the case
with applicant appellants. In other cases, arguments for or against development on landslideprone slopes are more apparently values-based, as is the case with neighbor appellants. In
every dispute, the question of slope stability was raised by at least one actor, either explicitly
as concern or slope stability, or indirectly, through concern for the issues of drainage or
erosion. However, actors had different perspectives on the integrity of the slope based on
their preferred outcome. For example, neighbor appellants, who opposed development and
voiced concern for the aesthetic impact of development, often perceived the slope as
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unstable, or of unknown stability, often advocating for more studies. On the other hand,
applicants, who supported development, avowed slope stability, pointing to their
geotechnical reports. As Sarewitz (2004) argues often happens in politicized environmental
controversies, actors interpret science in a way that supports their preexisting views.
Applicants reaffirm their desire to build through the information provided to them by hired
engineers, while neighbors scrutinize the available data as insufficient in order to oppose
development.
Cultural theory as laid out by Douglas & Widavsky (1982) and reframed by Kahan
(2012) are helpful for contextualizing the importance of property rights, land value, freedom
to choose risk, and engineering safety as values and beliefs that drive actor arguments in
regulation disputes. In Seattle, such values are inherited culturally within an environment
characterized by capitalism, private land tenure, and an emphasis on modernism and science.
Values that focus on market freedom and freedom to choose risk are associated with
‘individualists’ within Douglas & Widavsky’s (1982) cultural typologies. While differences
in cultural values are argued to fuel controversies in some cases (Douglas & Widavsky;
Kahan, 2012), this is not necessarily the case for disputes about development in landslideprone areas of Seattle. Neighbor appellants and applicants appear to share at least a limited
set of values that emphasize land value and home and neighborhood as symbols of class.
Disputes do not necessarily arise from differences in values, but from the inability to
reconcile the implications of those values at a specific place and time. For instance, both
neighbor appellants and applicants value their property values, yet neighbor appellants
perceive new development as reducing their land value by blocking views and natural light,
while applicants believe they must develop in order to maximize land value. Neighbors are
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often concerned with the impact of new development on neighborhood character and
computability, which generally refers to consistency in structure style and size, and
especially in density. They may perceive deviance from the status quo, for example a
stylistically different structure or the development of multi-family housing, as inconsistent
with their class and cultural identity. Applicants too are concerned with representation of
class and cultural identity in their development proposals. That concern is demonstrated in
the very choice to purchase a landslide-prone plot of land because of the magnificent views it
offers and the coveted neighborhood in which it is found.
In a cultural theory typology, the government may be considered a blend of
‘individualistic’ and ‘hierarchic’ outlooks; it attempts to cater to private development
interests while also maintaining institutional order and relying on science and technical
expertise for decision-making, which is characteristic of the hierarchical typology. For
example, Seattle’s ECA code allows individuals to develop their properties, but requires
mitigation with high standards that are based in science. Maintaining a middle ground
between typologies allows the government to represent diverse public values, which may
compete inherently or circumstantially. The most difficult balance of values a government
must maintain is that between property rights, championed by land use applicants, and safety,
a value likely shared by most but conceptualized and prioritized differently across actors. The
government’s consideration of both values through its land use policy demonstrates its
commitment to managing multiple interests, but it also reveals a strategy that seeks to
minimize government losses. Blocking development in hazard areas leaves the government at
risk for costly takings lawsuits, while allowing development in hazard areas leaves the
government at risk for future negligence and wrongful death lawsuits. The government’s
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middle ground policy is defined by development with mitigation, with development that
adheres to standards developed through the review of best-available science. Regulation is
scientized, with the burden of proof on the applicant to demonstrate through science that a
project meets regulatory standards, and can satisfy a values-based public expectation of
safety.
Safety is a standard public value for its inherent moral undertone. Yet the
government’s commitment to safety can also be seen as financial loss mitigation, in that by
precluding disasters, it avoids costly lawsuits. Safety, then, is a two-toned value that the
government has an interest in incorporating into regulation, and it has been able to do so
through the development of scientized standards that ensure hazard mitigation. The state is
responsible for scientizing regulations in this manner through GMA standards, which, when
passed, was arguably based more in values of conservation than in public safety, yet those
values conveniently align for the purpose of land use regulation.
Sarewitz (2004) argues that certain controversies are more likely to be scientized,
rather than left to values-based decision processes, when actors believe that the use of
science can help them further their interests, when “scientists are involved in the political
framing of the controversy” (398), and when policy options lack political consensus.
Development in landslide hazard areas is characterized by all of these factors; applicants and
government alike can leverage their interests through the commissioning of science or
technical studies. Scientists are often involved in the framing of hazard through the
publication of op-eds and the provision of ‘best available science’ for policy. Landslide risk,
like many natural hazards, is especially amenable to scientific framing – events are
infrequent, based upon complex stochastic processes, and are often embedded in
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environmental processes perceived to beyond the realm of society and the politics that
envelop it. Even so, the public circumstantially disagrees on policy outcomes stemming both
from uncertainty about the hazard and from the competing values and different levels of
acceptable risk, as seen in the values and preferred outcomes of the actors analyzed here. The
GMA has allowed for science-based resolution in policy, where values may have otherwise
competed to be the basis of decision-making. Science-based policy, however, benefits certain
actors more than others.
Applicants often use science to mask values-based positions, employing sciencebased arguments, particularly arguments that development promotes slope stability, to
promote an outcome that stems from values. Some applicant values, such as property rights,
are supported by law, and do not need to be masked. However, the more aesthetic values that
draw applicants to develop in hazardous areas must be subdued in an appeal process where
such values have no weight. In their place, the actors attempt to use arguments that are based
in science and technical information. The science and technical information used by
applicants is not necessarily invalid, but often relies upon the imperfect science of
engineering to demonstrate project feasibility.
Public opposition to development on landslide-prone slopes and skepticism of
engineering as an appropriate remedy for natural hazard risk may be explained in part by
growing distrust of science. Despite design for stability and strength, some of the public and
government may view the engineering of stability on landslide-prone slopes with misgivings,
fearing that overreliance on structural ingenuity will result in disaster, which may be a
financial burden bore by taxpayers. Jasanoff (1996) suggests that the advancement of science
knowledge “has also reinforced archetypal fears about science and technology that
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overshadow the promises of healing, regeneration, material well-being, and unbroken
progress” (63) and this may ring true for engineering science as well. Indeed, Jasanoff (1990)
suggests that distrust in science may be fueled in part by a distrust in the impartiality of
scientists.
The role of scientists in policymaking is controversial, and often blurry. The
classically conceptualized role of a scientist is that of a neutral and objective purveyor of
facts, though, as Pielke Jr (2007) argues, few scientists neatly conform to that description,
and most participate in some degree of advocacy. Advocacy may be explicit, such as when
scientists argue for a specific outcome or criticize a specific policy, or what Pielke Jr terms
‘stealth,’ which is a more subtle form of advocacy that occurs when scientists communicate a
limited amount of information or options. Scientist advocacy is more apparent on
controversial issues like climate change and vaccines, in part because these issues concern
widespread environmental and human health.
Like other major debates that regard human health and the environment, natural
hazard regulation are similarly contentious as natural hazards pose a threat to human lives
and property, while hazard regulation has implications for property rights and values. In
regards to hazard policy, scientists often advocate certain policies through writing op-eds for
local newspapers or by providing their quoted opinions to a reporter. One university
geologist, who has written many op-eds about landslide policy, said:
[Writing op-eds is] an interesting process because you’re trying, by doing that, to
shape thinking and sometimes advocating particular policies, but you’re pretty much
wearing the hat of an individual. You’re not wearing the hat of whoever you work
for, you’re basically saying look, I’m a geologist, I know something about these
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issues, here’s what I think we should do. And in that sense, usually you write an oped to try to influence policy. It’s sometimes to make a statement in the aftermath of a
disaster but usually you’re trying to shape something (Anonymous, personal
communication, September 25, 2015).

All scientists who work with natural hazards likely have personal opinions about what
ought to be done in hazard regulation because they are individual citizens as well as
scientists. However, some scientists are purposeful about trying to separate their professional
self from their personal self and many of those interviewed, especially government scientists,
avowed that scientists are, and should be, separated from policy. One government geologist,
when asked how he interacts with policy, said that while he provides tools for policymakers
to use, he is “agnostic” about whether or not they are used, and strives to practice his
profession in the most neutral way possible:
Advocacy to me, it is the biggest enemy of science. I will speak generally and not
specifically but in the generations of people coming behind me . . . [T]hey are going
into it because of advocacy. [These people say,] ‘I want to be a scientist and I want to
study this because I want this outcome. I want to change the world. I want to change
the country. I want to make people safe. I want to do all of these things.’ And they are
coming at it as advocates, as crusaders in some ways. And that saddens and terrifies
me in terms of the future of [science] because if you are coming at it as an advocate
then you have confirmation bias. You are looking for things to support what you
already believe, you will find them, and you will ignore contrary evidence. You might
not do it consciously but you will do it. You will design experiments that are intended
to find evidence for what you already believe, for what you think is the case. And
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that’s the broad area of what’s called confirmation bias . . . and I find that deeply
concerning (Anonymous, personal communication, February 22, 2016).

When scientists play advocates, the cause or position for which they argue may
temporarily benefit from the support of someone viewed as a source of objectivity. Yet
scientists who advocate a more neutral approach fear that over time, advocacy reduces the
public’s trust in science and scientific institutions if they are increasingly seen as partial to
specific causes. Another government geologist said:
Science doesn’t have a whole lot to say [about politics] because these are societal
choice about risk perception. At some point, we get shut out of the conversation. And
I don’t disagree with that I guess…It’s okay to inform it, but to influence, it reduces
our effectiveness (Anonymous, personal communication, February 22, 2016).

Even when scientists do not participate in policy discussions, their work may be
dismissed by virtue of the policy that it may imply if that policy is undesired within a specific
cultural context. Actors debating development on landslide-prone or steep slopes in Seattle
may dismiss scientific information when its findings do not align well with the actor’s
preferred values. Kahan et al. (2012) argues that people are so concerned with social
cohesion and group identity than they may reject science or other information when it
conflicts with group cultural values. In Seattle, neighbor appellants often dismiss scientific or
technical findings that suggest low risk development if development is undesirable for them.
Neighbor appellants, like applicants, operate upon their values, but do not use science or
technical information in their arguments. Rather, they argue in moral terms of fairness and
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decency, and often speculate that there are small inconsistencies between a proposal and
standards within the land use code or SEPA without providing concrete evidence for those
claims. Policies within the land use code and SEPA that cater to the values of neighborhood
compatibility and aesthetics may be intentionally vague, and generally limit development
only through zoning, height limits, and preservation of public spaces. They are not designed
to guide development according to subjective neighbor preferences. As a result, neighbor
arguments that are based in values and personal preference and not science lack advantage in
changing land use decisions in ECA areas. Perhaps because of this disadvantage, neighbors
tend to call for more science, dismissing applicant science as not credible or insufficient,
which Oreskes & Conway (2011) describe as a tactic used by values-based actors in the
science controversy over smoking and climate change in the latter half of the twentieth
century.
What is clear from analysis of disputes in Seattle is that, though science matters in
terms of creating sound hazard risk policy, and in assessing hazard risk on specific sites,
average citizens are more concerned with maintaining their interests, regardless of what
‘science says.’ Kahan et al. (2012) found that actor beliefs on climate change were most
heavily based upon cultural values, not, as is commonly believed, by science literacy. The
same may be true of actors debating landslide regulations. Certain actors may use science in
their arguments, but preexisting values most heavily determine whether an actor views
landslide risk policy, and the science supporting it, as fair and reasonable.
Citizens may be more concerned with policies that they perceive as fair and equitable
than they are with scientific risk assessments. As Rayner and Cantor (1987) suggested, “the
critical question facing societal risk managers is not ‘How safe is safe enough?’ but ‘How
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fair is safe enough?’”(3). Of course, perceptions of what type of policy is fair may vary
drastically, just as values do. While neighbors may perceive the approval of new
development as unfair and burdensome to the neighborhood in its blockage of views or light,
the applicants for the project may perceive the restriction of development as unfair and
burdensome to them. Perception of, and support for, landslide risk regulations depend on an
individual’s outlook on what level of risk is acceptable, how policy outcomes affect their
perceived level of wellbeing, and what level of faith they have in reducing risk though
engineering. In this light, hazard risk policy based on science is acceptable to the public only
insofar as it meets their cultural, social, and individual needs. When it does not, it is
disputed. However, in order to influence a policy outcome, an actor must present science
information that meets DCI’s standards for allowing or blocking development.

Limitations and future work
The United States in general, with its penchant for free market solutions may be
characterized by an individualistic cultural typology, yet this is only a broad generalization.
Different communities, and individual actors within communities, may prescribe to the
values, and the associated risk concerns these values entail, to greater or lesser extents. As
this work finds, when actors are confronted with the development of their neighbor’s
property, they very well may draw upon values that compete with individualistic cultural
typologies. More work is needed to understand the values and regulatory approaches of
jurisdictions outside of the Seattle urban environment.
This study of land-use regulations on landslide-prone and steep slopes in Seattle
examines the way in which land use policy has found a manageable equilibrium between
risk-accepting values of property rights and relatively more risk-adverse values of public
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safety and reduction of government liability. This particular equilibrium is specific to Seattle
during the time period of study, and it is worth noting that many geologists and planners
interviewed for this thesis perceive Seattle’s regulatory framework for landslides as
exceptionally risk-averse in comparison to other jurisdictions in Washington. Seattle’s
government has been purposeful in scientizing its policies through the proactive
commissioning of scientific studies, and rather strict implementation practices, but this may
not be the case for jurisdictions in which the values of property rights or economic
development are strong enough to preclude the passage and enforcement of stringent,
science-based regulations. The GMA requires that all Washington jurisdictions rely on
science-based standards for hazard regulations through the leveraging of ‘best available
science.’ The state also provides a model ordinance and guides to using ‘best available
science’ to policymakers. However, other jurisdictions may set lower standards for
development than in Seattle or interpret standards in a more flexible manner, depending on
risk evaluation, and on the values and priorities of the community.
Even despite statewide adherence to ‘best available science’ policies, obfuscation and
politicization of hazard risk science may occur where a strict, science-based standard
framework for regulating development in hazard areas would be too unpopular, and valuesbased interpretation of science may substantially affect development decisions. In these
cases, the production of more science, and specifically, incoming statewide LiDAR data, may
not necessarily lead to clear, science-based policy on how development should occur in
geologic hazard areas. Rather, much like in the case of climate change, such data may be
contested as invalid or irrelevant by actors with different values-based preferred outcomes.
Where hazard risk data suggests policy inconsistent with values-based preferences, actors
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may dismiss science integrity, or dismiss its relevance in light of the perceived benefits of
living in a location that has hazard risk.
Acceptable risk, while informed by risk realities, often operates more within the
realm of subjective desires than in science. Alhakami & Slovic (1994)’s findings that
individuals tend to perceive benefits inversely to risk suggest that where perceived benefits,
or values, are strong, science information suggesting risk may be psychologically
diminished. It is therefore difficult to create science-based hazard policy where a community
conceptualizes hazard as an acceptable risk and where communities prefer to support policy
that prioritizes their property rights, encourages economic growth, or allows individuals to
build their dream homes.
It is beyond the scope of this project to evaluate the policy environments of other
jurisdictions in Washington, and thus difficult to make assumptions about the use of science
and values in hazard policy in other jurisdictions in Washington. However, strong valuesbased disputes about policy decisions in an urban area like Seattle suggests that the same is
likely occurring in other jurisdictions that may not have as robust, science-based regulations.
The influence of values-based advocacy on policy is likely to be much stronger in
jurisdictions with less stringent regulations, and science may not meaningfully affect policy.
Policymaking for other high magnitude, low frequency natural hazards such as earthquake
and tsunami likely experience the same values-based challenges, because these hazards
similarly have implications for development and their infrequency complicates risk
cognition. Like development standards for landslides in Seattle, earthquake policy has been
highly scientized in many jurisdictions through the adoption of the International Building
Code (IBC), which designs for seismic loading (ICC, 2016). Adherence to IBC standards
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may make development more expensive, but Seattle’s municipal code has no provisions that
affect location of development in earthquake hazard areas unless there is substantial
liquefaction risk. California, on the other hand, has restricted development in mapped fault
zones since the early 1970s (California Geological Survey, 2015). Where California has
definitively taken a hierarchic and science-based approach to regulating its earthquake risk
with arguably more risk-averse development restrictions than most other state or local
governments, it would be valuable to investigate how values and development interests have
challenged these restrictions, and the science that underlies it, over time.
While science is invaluable to understanding hazard risk and developing strategies for
coping with that risk, it is essential to keep in perspective the cultural and political contexts
in which that risk is located. As demonstrated in much of the discussed literature and in this
thesis, values are an essential part of decision-making, and may conflict with the policy
implications of science. As leaders call for more science to address landslide hazard, the
importance of diverse, and potentially shifting values within communities, must be
considered in order to create community-appropriate policies.
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Appendix

Semi-Structured Interview Questions for Policymakers
1. What are your professional responsibilities?
2. How do you consider or use science information to perform these responsibilities?
How do your colleagues? How is it ‘supposed’ to work?
3. Evaluate Seattle’s or King County’s current landslide framework. What are its
strengths and limitations? Whose interests are met by the current framework? Whose
are not?
4. What are the most important characteristics of landslide risk reducing policy? What
does an ideal policy look like to you? Where is it feasible?
5. What are the challenges to implementing that framework?
6. Thinking of the ideal policy you just describe, are you aware of stakeholders who
would NOT be pleased by such a policy? Why?
7. How do you make informed decisions when creating policy? From what sources do
you seek information? To what extent does information affect your decision? To what
extent does political climate affect your decision?
Semi-Structured Interview Questions for Geologists and geotechnical experts
1. How did you get into geology and hazards? Describe your trajectory.
2. How do geologists interact with policy related to landslide risk in Western
Washington? (state, county, city, private)
3. In your personal opinion, is science in most cases sufficiently reflected in policy?
Why may this be?
4. Evaluate Seattle’s current approach to development on slopes. What are its strengths
and limitations? Whose interests are met by the current approach? Whose are not?
5. What, in your opinion, would improve the regulatory approach in Seattle? (e.g. What
are the most important characteristics of landslide risk reducing policy? What does an
ideal policy look like to you?)
6. With whom else should I be speaking?
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INFORMED CONSENT - PARTICIPANT
This interview is being conducted to inform a Master’s Thesis on how science and technical
information are used in disputes about landslide regulation in Seattle, WA. Your input will
help the researcher to better understand the character of landslide risk regulation in Seattle, as
well as your personal and professional perspectives on the issue.
This interview will last approximately one hour. This interview is semi-structured, which
means the researcher will ask you pre-determined questions, but also may ask you questions
that arise during the conversation. Questions will be related to your knowledge of landslide
regulations in Seattle and in Western Washington, as well as your professional and personal
experience with landslide hazards or landslide regulations. The interview will be recorded,
and the researcher may also take notes. Your participation is completely voluntary, and you
are free to withdraw your participation at any time.
Your identity will be kept anonymous, and all interview materials, including this consent
form, will be kept in a locked office at Western Washington University or on a passwordprotected computer. Only the researcher and her advisor, Dr. Rebekah Paci-Green, will read
notes and listen to audio of this interview. Materials will be destroyed at the end of this
research.
This research is conducted by Ana Miscolta-Cameron, a graduate student at Western
Washington University. Any questions you have about the research or your participation may
be directed to her at 206-920-8056 or by e-mail at amiscolta@gmail.com. If you have any
questions about your participation or your rights as a research participant, you can contact
Janai Symons, Research Compliance Officer at Western Washington University, at 360-6503082. If during or after participation in this study you suffer from any adverse effects as a
result of participation, please notify the researcher directing the study or the WWU Research
Compliance Officer.
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